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WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR? THE 
CASE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
CHRISTOPHER J. PETERS* 
Abstract 
District of Columbia v. Heller—the Supreme Court’s 2008 Second 
Amendment decision—was the occasion for a momentous national 
conversation that never happened. Heller sparked heated debates about the 
Court’s originalist interpretive methodology, but virtually nobody asked 
what should have been an obvious question: Even if the Court got the 
meaning of the Second Amendment right, why should we obey that 
amendment? 
This is the curiously underexplored question of the authority of 
constitutional rights: Why, indeed whether, we have some obligation to 
respect those rights even when we disagree with them. The Second 
Amendment brings that question front and center in a way arguably not 
seen since the demise of the Fugitive Slave Clause 150 years ago. Like that 
infamous clause, the Second Amendment features relatively specific text—
protecting a “right . . . to keep and bear Arms”—that itself is sufficient to 
provoke controversy, regardless of precisely how that text is interpreted. 
Americans who disagree with a “right” to abortion can take some comfort 
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in the belief that the Supreme Court, in construing the Due Process 
Clauses, got the meaning of “liberty” wrong. But Americans who disagree 
with a “right . . . to keep and bear Arms” have no one to blame but the 
Constitution itself. 
Should these Americans nonetheless treat the Second Amendment as 
authoritative, and if so, why? In seeking to answer that question, the 
analysis in this Article suggests some important truths about constitutional 
rights more generally. It suggests, first of all, that justifying the authority of 
constitutional rights is not as easy as is often assumed. Most accounts of 
constitutional authority are substantive in nature: they tell us to obey the 
Constitution because of what the Constitution commands. The author 
contends that none of these substantive accounts are plausible. The 
authority of the Constitution must be justified procedurally—based not on 
what it commands, but on how it commands us—or not at all. 
Most interpretations of the Second Amendment, however, do not comport 
with a procedural understanding of constitutional authority. A procedural 
account does not justify Heller’s individual-self-defense reading of the 
Amendment or the various “anti-tyranny” readings common in popular 
discourse. Only the “structural federalism” interpretation advanced by the 
dissenters in Heller is arguably consistent with a procedural account of 
constitutional authority. 
The implications of this conclusion extend well beyond the Second 
Amendment itself. They imply a jurisdictional principle of constitutional 
law, according to which other constitutional provisions and doctrines—
including, the author suggests, the abortion right and other aspects of 
“substantive” due process—might lack a valid claim to constitutional 
authority. They also suggest a principle of constitutional interpretation: all 
else being equal, the Court should interpret a constitutional provision in the 
way that best justifies its authority over us. 
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I. Introduction: The Second Amendment 
 and the Question of Constitutional Authority 
District of Columbia v. Heller was the occasion for a momentous 
national conversation that never happened. In that 2008 decision, the 
Supreme Court held for the first time that the Second Amendment protects 
an individual right to possess handguns for self-defense.1 Heller sparked 
heated debates over the propriety of the Court’s originalist interpretive 
methodology2 and the accuracy with which that methodology was applied.3 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. Critiques of originalism, focusing on Heller, include Saul Cornell, Originalism on 
Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 
626 (2008) (“Scalia’s decision demonstrates that . . . originalism is . . . a lawyer’s version of 
a magician’s parlor trick . . . .”); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 609, 610 (2008) (arguing that Heller demonstrates that “the new originalism cannot 
deliver on its promises” to remove judicial discretion from judging); and Richard A. Posner, 
In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.newrepublic.com/ 
article/books/defense-looseness (arguing that “[t]rue originalism licenses loose construction” 
as opposed to Heller’s “narrow” methodology). Defenses of originalism focusing on Heller 
include Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History: District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2009) (calling Justice Scalia’s Heller 
opinion “carefully reasoned and scholarly”); Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The 
Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13, http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB121452412614009067 (“Justice Scalia's opinion is exemplary . . . . [It] is the 
finest example of . . . ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme 
Court.”). 
 3. Many observers who do not themselves endorse originalism have asserted that the 
Heller majority opinion was more consistent with evolving popular views than with the 
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But virtually no one asked what should have been an obvious question: 
Even if the Heller Court got the meaning of the Second Amendment right, 
why should we obey that decision? Why, that is, should we obey the 
Second Amendment? 
That question should have been obvious because the Second 
Amendment, unlike most rights-conferring provisions of our Constitution, 
is controversial on its face. Most rights provisions engender dispute, not 
because of what their text reveals, but because of what it hides. There is 
nothing controversial, for instance, about the merits of protecting “life, 
liberty, or property,” as the text of the Due Process Clauses clearly does.4 In 
the abstract, everybody likes those values, and that is how they are 
expressed in the text: in the abstract. Just about everyone similarly approves 
(in the abstract) of “the freedom of speech” and “the free exercise” of 
“religion” that are protected by the First Amendment,5 and of “the equal 
protection of the laws” that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth.6 The 
disagreement about these provisions centers not on what they clearly say, 
but on how the Court has interpreted and applied them to particular 
issues—on whether “liberty” includes a right to choose an abortion, for 
example, or whether “the freedom of speech” prohibits regulation of 
corporate-funded “issue ads” during an election. 
The Second Amendment is different. The text of that Amendment reads, 
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”7 
Whatever the import of the so-called “prefatory clause” invoking a 
“Militia,”8 or the precise meaning of the term “the people,” the Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
original understanding. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular 
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-
22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009). Some pro-originalist commentators shared this basic 
critique. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 1343 (2009). Others accused Heller of getting the history wrong, see 
David C. Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Uses of Guns, 
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 641 (2008), or of mangling the Second Amendment’s text, see Posner, 
supra note 2. But some prominent figures of the so-called “New Originalism” movement 
vigorously defended Heller’s methodology. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of 
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 940 (2009); Barnett, supra 
note 2. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 5. Id. amend. I. 
 6. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 7. Id. amend. II. 
 8. This is what Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, called it in Heller. 554 U.S. at 595. 
2016]      WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR? 437 
 
 
clearly protects some instances of weapons possession from government 
interference; it clearly limits in some way the government’s ability to 
regulate firearms. A significant number of Americans, however, disagrees, 
as a matter of policy or political morality, with the wisdom of protecting 
any right to possess guns.9 
The relative specificity of the right protected by the Second Amendment 
thus renders the amendment almost innately controversial, regardless of 
how it is interpreted. By way of analogy, imagine a constitutional provision 
explicitly protecting “a woman’s right to abort a fetus she carries.” Surely 
there would be interpretive controversy over the precise meaning and 
application of the provision—whether it protects late-term abortions, for 
example. But the controversy would not disappear if the Court somehow 
magically struck upon the one true meaning of the text. Whatever the “right 
to abort a fetus” means, it must mean at least that some fetuses can be 
aborted without government interference. And that idea by itself would be 
enough to anger a great many Americans. 
Or consider a real-world (though now thankfully defunct) analogy: the 
Fugitive Slave Clause, which gave to slave owners (parties to whom 
“Service or Labour may be due”) a right to have escaped slaves (“Person[s] 
held to Service or Labour”) “delivered up” upon the slave owner’s 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Just how many Americans appears to be a difficult question to answer. Public-
opinion surveys typically ask, not about objections to gun possession in the abstract, but 
about support for particular gun regulations or, more generally, attitudes toward relatively 
amorphous concepts like “gun control.” See, e.g., Growing Public Support for Gun Rights, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/10/growing-
public-support-for-gun-rights/ (reporting results of survey asking, inter alia, whether 
respondents think “it is more important . . . to protect the right of Americans to own guns, 
[or] to control gun ownership”); see also Margie Omero et al., What the Public Really 
Thinks About Guns, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 27, 2013), https://cdn.american 
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/GunPolling-5.pdf (reporting overall trends in 
recent attitudes on gun-related issues). Pre-Heller polls often asked about respondents’ 
understanding of the Second Amendment, which of course is not the same thing as asking 
about their underlying moral views. See, e.g., Guns: CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll June 
4-5, 2008, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm (last visited Jan. 
12, 2016) (asking whether respondents think the Amendment “guarantee[s] each person the 
right to own a gun, or [rather] protect[s] the right of citizens to form a militia without 
implying that each individual has the right to own a gun”); Guns: USA Today/Gallup Poll 
Feb. 8-10, 2008, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2016) (asking whether respondents “believe the Second Amendment . . . 
guarantees the rights of Americans to own guns, or . . . only guarantees members of state 
militias such as National Guard units the right to own guns”). 
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“Claim.”10 The proper interpretation of the clause was a matter of 
contention, to be sure.11 But it would have been difficult to read the clause 
in a way that did not require “delivering up” at least some fugitive slaves—
and that in itself was sufficient to convince many Americans that the 
Fugitive Slave Clause (perhaps even the Constitution as a whole) was 
wicked.12 
The Second Amendment thus brings front and center the question, not 
merely of how the Court should interpret constitutional rights, but of why—
indeed whether—those rights ought to bind us at all. It is a strangely 
underexplored question in American constitutional discourse. The debate 
over the “countermajoritarian difficulty” of judicial review is so familiar as 
to be wearisome;13 but that debate almost invariably focuses on the courts’ 
role in deciding constitutional issues, not on the question of why 
democratically enacted policies ought to be trumped by centuries-old 
constitutional provisions, however the courts may interpret them.14 
The questions of whether, and why, constitutional rights bind us—of 
whether (and why) we, the democratic majority, ought to obey them—are 
questions about the authority of the Constitution. Authority is a nuanced 
concept, as I explain in Part II, but its basic gist is this: if a command (say, a 
constitutional provision) possesses authority, we are obligated to obey it 
                                                                                                                 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
 11. For example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), the Court 
interpreted the Fugitive Slave Clause broadly to override state requirements of judicial 
process before alleged escaped slaves could be privately seized. The decision provoked 
considerable resistance in the North, including new state laws like that in Massachusetts, 
which barred the use of state employees or facilities to assist in “recapturing” alleged 
fugitives. See 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY 395 (3d ed. 
2011). 
 12. Abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips “condemned the 
Constitution as a proslavery compact, which they called a ‘covenant with death’ and ‘an 
agreement in Hell.’” UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 11, at 385. 
 13. For more on this point, see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: 
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
 14. This, for instance, was the exclusive focus of the book by Alexander Bickel that 
inducted the phrase “the countermajoritarian difficulty” into the lexicon. ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d 
ed. 1986). Bickel set the terms of the debate in which American constitutional theorists have 
been engaged ever since, and many of the most significant subsequent entries in that debate 
also have attended to judicial review in particular rather than constitutionalism more 
generally. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1-38 (1996). 
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even if we disagree with it, and without regard to the possibility of 
punishment for disobedience. If the command lacks authority, however, we 
have no obligation to obey it; obedience to a nonauthoritative command is a 
moral mistake. If the Second Amendment lacks legitimate authority, it 
cannot bind Americans who disagree with its content. 
And note that such a failure of authority would be problematic even if a 
majority of America agrees with a given constitutional provision, as is 
probably the case with the Second Amendment at the time of this writing.15 
Constitutional disobedience need not be national in scope. A state or 
municipality, for example, whose majority disapproves of a “right . . . to 
keep and bear Arms”16 could enact laws infringing that right, in essence 
thumbing its collective nose at the Second Amendment. A judge who 
disapproves of the right could refuse to enjoin one of these state or local 
laws. A relatively small group of congressmen opposed to the right could 
block a federal legislative remedy against recalcitrant states and localities. 
And so on. 
The authority of constitutional provisions like the Second Amendment 
therefore is an issue of considerable importance. The sources and merits of 
the Constitution’s claim to authority, however, turn out to be remarkably 
unclear. This Article uses the Second Amendment as a framework for 
exploring the foundations of constitutional authority. Building on earlier 
work, I examine the range of reasonable accounts of that authority, finding 
most of them unconvincing. Most accounts of constitutional authority are 
what I call substantive in nature: they require obedience to the Constitution 
because of what the Constitution commands. I contend that the only 
plausible justification of constitutional authority is not substantive in this 
sense, but rather procedural: it requires obedience to the Constitution, not 
because of what it commands, but because of how it commands us—that is, 
because of the process by which constitutional commands are generated. 
I then measure the Second Amendment against this procedural account 
of constitutional authority. There are a number of ways to interpret the 
Amendment that are reasonable in light of our interpretive traditions, but 
most of these interpretations rest on one or more implausible substantive 
theories of authority. This includes both the Heller “individual self-
defense” reading and the “anti-tyranny” reading that is common in popular 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See, e.g., Omero et al., supra note 9, at 2 (“There is an emerging consensus on guns 
among the American public. Most Americans agree that handguns should not be banned, 
that more needs to be done to keep guns away from dangerous people, and that military-style 
weapons don’t belong on the streets.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
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discourse.17 I argue that if these interpretations are correct, the Second 
Amendment lacks authority over us; we have no moral obligation to obey 
it. As an alternative to these problematic readings of the amendment, I point 
to the interpretation advanced by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Heller, 
which has at least a credible claim to consistency with a procedural account 
of constitutional authority.18 
My analysis, while hopefully interesting to participants in the Heller 
debate, has significance well beyond the Second Amendment. First, it 
provides markers that can be used to spot other problematic constitutional 
provisions or interpretations and to avoid adding such provisions to our 
Constitution in the future. For instance, the analysis suggests that the 
Court’s “substantive due process” decisions—including its recognition of 
an abortion right—rest on weak authoritative foundations. The Article thus 
points toward a sort of jurisdictional principle of constitutionalism, 
justifying constitutional rules that serve procedural functions but not those 
that simply impose controversial substantive values on an otherwise 
democratic process. 
Second, the analysis suggests that considerations of constitutional 
authority ought to play a role in constitutional interpretation—not just in the 
development of general interpretive methodologies, as I’ve argued 
elsewhere,19 but also in the interpretation of particular constitutional 
provisions. A reasonable interpretation that makes sense of constitutional 
authority—one that gives us a reason to obey the provision being 
interpreted—is better than one that fails to do so, all else being equal. 
II. What Is Constitutional Authority (and Why Should We Care)? 
Constitutional authority is the central concept in this Article, and in this 
part, I explain what it is and why it matters. I begin in Section A by 
discussing the features of legal authority generally. In Section B, I describe 
the need for a theory to explain whether, and how, legitimate authority can 
exist. In Section C, I note the special dynamics of legal authority in the 
context of constitutional law, and in Section D I suggest that these 
dynamics make it particularly difficult to justify constitutional authority. 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See infra note 140. 
 18. 554 U.S. 570, 636-78 (2008).  
 19. I have taken a position elsewhere about which of these purposes can justify general 
legal authority. See Christopher J. Peters, What Lies Beneath: Interpretive Methodology, 
Constitutional Authority, and the Case of Originalism, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1251 [hereinafter 
Peters, What Lies Beneath].  
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A. The Concept of Legal Authority 
Law purports to have amazing powers. It purports to tell its subjects how 
to behave, even when those subjects disagree with what the law 
commands—indeed, as I’ll explain, even when the law is wrong—and even 
when disobedience is unlikely to be detected. And of course it claims the 
right to punish subjects whose disobedience is detected. 
Law, in other words, claims authority. “Authority is the right to 
command,” writes Robert Paul Wolff, “and correlatively, the right to be 
obeyed.”20 Wolff himself argues that such a right does not exist,21 but let us 
suppose for present purposes that it does. Assuming it exists, what does this 
“right to be obeyed” entail? 
(1) Normativity. First, it entails a right to be obeyed even in cases where 
punishment for disobedience is unlikely. Consider the substance of most 
legal commands: they purport to apply to everyone within their purview, 
not just those who fear being punished for disobeying them. The obligation 
to report one’s full income on one’s tax return, for example, applies to 
every person required to file a return, not just to citizens likely to be tagged 
for an IRS audit. Speed-limit signs on the highway do not read “65 mph 
(except when no cops are around).” Clearly the authors of these laws intend 
them to apply in all cases, including those many cases in which coercive 
enforcement is unlikely. 
This understanding about legal commands is not limited to lawmakers or 
other legal officials; it is shared by those subject to law as well. As H.L.A. 
Hart famously made clear, people who are subject to law typically perceive 
an obligation to obey the law that does not depend on coercion.22 Hart 
observed that our typical moral intuitions about legal commands differ from 
our intuitions about orders backed up only by threats of force; while we 
might feel “obliged” to hand over our money to an armed robber, we would 
not think ourselves “under an obligation” to do so.23 In contrast, we have an 
“obligation” to send money to the IRS by April 15. While the necessity of 
obeying the gunman disappears as soon as the gunman (or the gun) is gone, 
                                                                                                                 
 20. ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 4 (rev. ed. 1998); see also Scott J. 
Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
382, 385-87 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (describing Wolff’s views). 
 21. WOLFF, supra note 20. 
 22. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82-91 (2d ed. 1994). Hart’s analytical 
conclusion is supported by empirical research. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE 
LAW 62-68 (2006) (reporting results of an empirical study suggesting that people often obey 
the law because of “normative” beliefs in the law’s legitimacy). 
 23. HART, supra note 22, at 82-83. 
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our obligation to pay our taxes exists, and persists, even if we are unlikely 
to suffer punishment for failing to pay them. Our fortuitous evasion of an 
audit, or our intentional fleeing of the jurisdiction to avoid payment, might 
escape the coercion, but it does not erase the obligation.24 
I will refer to this property of authority—its capacity to require 
obedience even absent coercion—as normativity. In claiming a right to be 
obeyed, law and other supposed authorities claim a normative power, the 
power to create a certain kind of reason for action: a reason why one ought 
to act in a certain way, regardless of whether one is being physically 
coerced into doing so. 
This is not to say that there is no relationship between legal authority and 
coercion. It seems likely that the right to coerce obedience follows from the 
existence of legal authority. As Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin point 
out, “[I]ndividuals will sometimes err in their [moral] calculations and 
disobey [a legal] rule . . . when they believe that its prescription is wrong 
for the circumstances in which they find themselves.”25 Coerced obedience 
may be necessary to prevent people from acting on these moral 
miscalculations. It may also be necessary to prevent people from 
unjustifiably disobeying the law, not due to moral miscalculation, but 
simply out of bad faith. In other words, if law imposes an obligation of 
obedience, it may be appropriate to enforce that obligation by coercion. 
But it is the obligation that licenses the coercion, not the coercion that 
creates the obligation. If the power to coerce obedience were sufficient to 
generate normativity—to create a moral obligation to obey—then there 
would be no meaningful moral difference between the tax laws and the 
demands of an armed robber. Evading taxes would then be the moral 
equivalent of escaping a robbery. To the contrary, even when we cheat the 
government we acknowledge that there is some moral cost in doing so. That 
is the significance of the language of “cheating”—that we are doing 
something at least a little wrong when we evade a command. As Wolff puts 
it, “[W]ho would speak of ‘cheating’ a thief?”26  
(2) Content-independence. An authority’s right to be obeyed also exists 
regardless of the moral content of what the authority is commanding. 
Authorities do not say “Obey this command provided it is the right thing to 
do”; they say, simply, “Obey this command.” Authoritative commands thus 
differ from arguments, which invite the audience to decide for themselves 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. at 83-84. 
 25. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, & 
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 54 (2001). 
 26. WOLFF, supra note 20, at 4. 
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how best to act, with the argument as a prod or a guide. “[Arguments] 
attempt to convince the person that they ought to act in certain ways . . . . 
Commands, on the other hand, are not designed to convince their 
addressees of the wisdom of their contents.”27 Commands demand 
obedience, not moral contemplation. “To obey a command is to perform the 
act commanded for the reason that it was commanded.”28  
To obey a command “for the reason that it was commanded” is 
necessarily to obey that command without regard to its moral content.29 
Driving no faster than sixty-five miles per hour might be the correct thing 
to do in a particular circumstance, morally speaking, or it might be 
incorrect. Morality, properly considered, might permit driving as fast as 
(say) seventy-five in a given circumstance, despite the existence of a sixty-
five-miles-per-hour speed limit. But the driver who obeys the speed limit 
does not stop to consider this question before doing so. If she decides to 
drive sixty-five because she thinks that is the morally best speed, all things 
considered, then she is not really obeying the speed-limit law; she is 
obeying the dictates of morality, which happen in this case to coincide with 
the law’s command (or so she believes). And if she decides to drive 
seventy-five because she thinks that is the morally proper speed, then 
clearly she is not obeying the law even in a superficial sense. 
True obedience precludes an all-things-considered moral judgment. And 
so our reason to obey the law or some other authoritative command must be 
something other than the command’s consistency with morality. Legal 
philosophers refer to this requirement as one of content-independence: the 
duty to obey an authority must be independent of the moral content of the 
authority’s commands. 30 
In fact this requirement is simply an entailment of the property of 
normativity discussed above. In order for a command to impose a moral 
reason for action, it must change the calculus of moral reasons that would 
exist without the command; it must introduce to that calculus a new reason 
for action. The fact that a command is consistent with what morality 
already requires is not a new reason; people already have sufficient reason 
to do what morality requires. Normativity entails some additional reason to 
obey a command, independent of its consistency with the demands of 
morality. 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 386. 
 28. Id. (emphasis added). 
 29. See id.  
 30. See H.L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON 
BENTHAM 253-55 (1982); Shapiro, supra note 20, at 389. 
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(3) Special moral force or moral status. Finally, the right to be obeyed 
entails that the content-independent moral reason or reasons for obedience 
be stronger than, or have a superior status to, ordinary reasons for action. 
This property is inherent in the notion of a right to be obeyed, and in the 
correlative notion of a duty or obligation to obey. A duty or obligation is 
greater than a mere reason to act. 
Compare law in this respect to other examples of actions taken in 
response to someone’s “order” or request. It is common to speak of 
“doctor’s orders,” for example, so suppose a doctor counsels her patient to 
avoid high-cholesterol foods. The patient might be strongly inclined to 
follow the doctor’s advice, since the doctor is, relative to the patient, an 
expert (an “authority”) on matters of health. Except in unusual 
circumstances, however, the patient wouldn’t consider himself morally 
obligated to follow the doctor’s advice. Instead, the patient would treat that 
advice as simply another reason—albeit perhaps an especially weighty 
one—for taking a certain action. Sometimes that reason might be 
outweighed by countervailing reasons, as when the patient, celebrating his 
wedding anniversary at an expensive restaurant, decides that the occasion 
warrants ordering the filet mignon rather than the salad. 
A legal command differs in this sense from the “order” (really the 
advice) of a doctor. A command is not presented by the person issuing it, or 
understood by those subject to it, as simply one among many reasons for 
action, to be weighed against competing reasons. Of course commands—
legal rules, for example—may have exceptions, but those exceptions are 
themselves products of commands (e.g., the legal rule recognizing self-
defense as an exception to the legal rule prohibiting murder). Where no 
legal exception applies, legal officials expect obedience to the law, not just 
due consideration of whether to obey as part of an all-things-considered 
judgment about what to do. 
The question of what exactly is morally distinctive about an authoritative 
rule or command is controversial among legal philosophers. Some argue 
that authoritative commands take on a special status in our moral reasoning: 
they preempt or supplant other moral reasons for action, requiring us to act 
based on the command rather than on the full panoply of otherwise relevant 
reasons.31 Others contend that authoritative commands exert special force in 
our moral reasoning—creating a moral presumption, perhaps, that might be 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 25, at 4, 11-17, 26-34, 55-61; JOSEPH 
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 57-62 (1986). See generally Shapiro, supra note 20, at 
404-05. 
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overcome by countervailing factors.32 We can remain agnostic about these 
debates for purposes of this Article. The important thing to note is that the 
concept of authority presupposes more than just an everyday reason for 
obedience. It supposes a reason on the order of an obligation or duty, one 
that cannot simply be weighted on an equal basis with other moral reasons 
for action.  
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the limits of a “right to 
be obeyed” and a corresponding obligation to obey. It is implausible that 
the right and the corresponding obligation are absolute. The right and the 
obligation must be defeasible; they must be capable of being outweighed by 
competing considerations in certain circumstances, even if those 
circumstances are rare. Otherwise there would be no such thing as justified 
disobedience to valid law. We recognize that disobedience sometimes is 
justified, even when the law being disobeyed is valid. Exceeding the posted 
speed limit, for example, might be the right thing to do, morally speaking, if 
the driver is rushing a severely injured person to the hospital. This does not 
mean the speed-limit law is invalid; it means only that there are 
circumstances in which morality permits (perhaps even requires) 
disobedience to the law despite its validity. 
We should keep this point in mind in discussing constitutional authority: 
even a constitutional provision that is validly authoritative might on 
occasion be subject to justified disobedience. This, in essence, was 
Abraham Lincoln’s position in defense of his unilateral suspension of 
habeas corpus in the early days of the Civil War.33 Lincoln told Congress 
not that the Suspension Clause lacked authority under those circumstances, 
but rather that disobeying it was justified despite its authority, lest “all the 
laws[,] but one[,] go unexecuted.”34 
B. Legitimate Authority 
Authority—the right to be obeyed—therefore is the conjunction of the 
properties of normativity, content-independence, and special (but not 
absolute) moral force or status. In shorthand, a command possesses 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 202-05 (1991); 
Stephen R. Perry, Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 
913, 966 (1989); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of 
Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1003-13 (1989). 
 33. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 11, at 459-63. 
 34. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 594, 601 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946). 
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authority if it imposes a defeasible content-independent moral obligation to 
act as the command directs. 
Of course, a person or institution might claim authority for its commands 
but do so unjustifiably: its commands might not in fact impose a defeasible 
content-independent moral obligation to act. This is possible even if those 
subject to the commands generally believe they are authoritative. De facto 
authority might exist without legitimate, or de jure, authority.35 Where this 
is the case, those subject to the supposed authority are committing a moral 
error, perhaps a quite serious one: they are obeying another’s commands 
without justification for doing so. 
Some have argued that there is no such thing as de jure, or legitimate, 
authority.36 Others have argued, somewhat more modestly, that law cannot 
possess legitimate authority, at least not in a general sense.37 To defeat 
these arguments, it would be necessary to articulate an account of legal 
authority that justifies law’s typical imposition of the kind of duty described 
in the previous section. An account of legitimate legal authority requires a 
justification of a general content-independent moral obligation (albeit only 
a defeasible one) to obey legal commands.38 
An account of constitutional authority—the subject of this Article—need 
not be quite so ambitious, although it may prove at least as difficult. Such 
an account need only justify the capacity of constitutional law (not law 
generally) to impose a defeasible content-independent moral obligation to 
act. If such an account is successful, then it can mark out the terms on 
which constitutional authority is legitimate—the circumstances in which 
those subject to a constitution have a duty to obey it, and in which they may 
be punished for failing to do so. If an account of constitutional authority is 
not successful, then obedience to a constitution according to the terms of 
that account, and enforcement of that obedience, are unjustified. And if no 
plausible account of constitutional authority is available, then constitutional 
obedience and constitutional enforcement are unjustified, full stop. Without 
constitutional authority, our practice of obeying the Constitution’s 
commands would be a moral mistake. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 35. See WOLFF, supra note 20, at 10; see also Shapiro, supra note 20, at 386. 
 36. See, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 20, at 10. 
 37. See, e.g., ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF 
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012). 
 38. I have attempted such an account elsewhere. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. PETERS, 
A MATTER OF DISPUTE: MORALITY, LAW, AND DEMOCRACY (2011) [hereinafter PETERS, 
MATTER OF DISPUTE].  
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C. The Particular Dynamics of Constitutional Authority 
That mistake, moreover, would be a serious one indeed, because it would 
entail the unjustified impairment of the democratic process. In most 
instances, those subject to the supposed authority of the United States 
Constitution are government decision makers, not private actors.39 
Constitutional law tells government officials what they must, may, and may 
not do; it applies to legislators, executive-branch officials, judges, and other 
government agents acting in their capacity as officials of government. 
Constitutional law also applies to individual citizens qua citizens: by 
limiting what their government may do, it limits what citizens can 
accomplish with their votes and political expression. Most of American 
constitutional law does not, however, apply to persons in their capacities as 
private actors. To put things in Hartian terms, constitutional law consists 
mostly of “secondary rules,” rules that are “about” the primary rules of 
conduct in the system—about how to create the primary rules, how to 
change them, and what their content can be.40 
Constitutional commands therefore demand the obedience of participants 
in the everyday democratic process. For those commands to possess 
legitimate authority, they must be capable of imposing a defeasible content-
independent obligation upon the democratic majority and its political 
representatives—capable, that is, of constraining ordinary democracy. 
D. The Special Problematics of Constitutional Authority 
In his provocative book On Constitutional Disobedience, Louis Michael 
Seidman argues that the United States Constitution lacks legitimate 
authority.41 The Constitution, Seidman contends, is a “deeply flawed, 
eighteenth-century document[.]”42 Yet it purports to limit what “We the 
People” (“the actual people of the here and now,” in the words of another 
constitutional theorist, Alexander Bickel43) can decide through democratic 
                                                                                                                 
 39. The current exceptions are the first clause of Section 3 of Article III, which defines 
the crime of treason, and the first clause of Article III, Section 3, and Section 1 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits “slavery or involuntary servitude” even when 
practiced by private actors. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The historical exception was the 
Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of 
intoxicating liquors” regardless of who was doing the manufacturing, selling, or 
transporting. Id. amend. XVIII, § 1 (repealed 1933). 
 40. HART, supra note 22, at 94. 
 41. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012). 
 42. Id. at 4. 
 43. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 17. 
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processes. “[W]ho in their right mind” would accept such a limitation? 
Seidman asks.44 Seidman addresses and rejects a litany of arguments in 
favor of constitutional authority, including the contention that “anarchy or 
tyranny” would result from constitutional disobedience.45 “Other 
successful, nonanarchic, and nontyrannical countries like the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand seem to do just fine without a written 
Constitution,” he points out.46 
Seidman’s argument might sound radical, but in fact it is just a recent 
volley in a long-running skirmish over the legitimacy of constitutional 
authority. For as long as American courts have been declaring government 
actions “unconstitutional,” people have argued that the supposed authority 
behind these acts of judicial review does not really exist.47 Typically these 
objections have been directed at the practice of judicial review (courts’ 
invalidation of political decisions, or refusal to enforce them, on 
constitutional grounds),48 although some recent critiques have focused more 
broadly on constitutional law itself, or on particularly salient aspects of 
constitutional law such as bills of rights.49 Like Seidman, these historical 
critics typically have lamented the supposedly “countermajoritarian” (that 
is, antidemocratic) impact of constitutional law.50 In advocating 
disobedience to the Constitution rather than (say) mere curtailment of 
                                                                                                                 
 44. SEIDMAN, supra note 41, at 7. 
 45. Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Friedman, supra note 13, at 172-215. 
 48. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
LECTURES (1958); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). But see RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S 
LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1-38, 332-47 (defending 
judicial review against many of these critiques); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (same); BICKEL, supra note 14 (same). 
 49. See, e.g., JAMES ALLAN, THE VANTAGE OF LAW: ITS ROLE IN THINKING ABOUT LAW, 
JUDGING AND BILLS OF RIGHTS (2011); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 211-
312 (1999) [hereinafter WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT]; Jeremy Waldron, The Core of 
the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1380-82 (2006) [hereinafter 
Waldron, Against Judicial Review]. Despite the title of Waldron’s article, it is in fact at least 
as much an attack on codified constitutional rights as on judicial review as a method of 
interpreting and enforcing them. 
 50. Alexander Bickel coined the term “The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty” to describe 
the tension between judicially enforced constitutional norms and the principles of 
democracy. See BICKEL, supra note 14, at 16. The term has since become commonplace, 
though it usually is rendered without Bickel’s hyphen. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 13, at 
13. 
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judicial review, Seidman has simply pushed these critiques to their logical 
conclusion. 
Seidman also makes explicit what has typically been an unstated premise 
of these critiques: that ordinary democratic processes are fully capable of 
performing most or all of the functions of law without the need for a 
judicially enforceable constitution.51 We can imagine a number of purposes 
that might justify law in general, such as inducing morally correct action, 
resolving costly disputes, and solving coordination problems. In essence, 
Seidman and these other critics ask why we can’t just rely on everyday 
democratic lawmaking to serve these aims. As Seidman points out, it seems 
unlikely that anarchy or tyranny would immediately result if we stopped 
obeying the Constitution; subconstitutional law could simply pick up the 
slack.52 This, after all, is what happens in liberal democracies without 
written constitutions, like Great Britain. 
These critics thus question the benefits of constitutional law. And, on the 
other side of the equation, they emphasize its rather troubling costs in the 
coin of democracy. When the “eighteenth-century” Constitution was 
ratified, “No women, African Americans, or Indians and few individuals 
without property were allowed to cast votes.”53 Worse, “[N]o one alive 
today had anything to do with the ratification process. As Thomas Jefferson 
famously insisted, the world belongs to the living.”54 Constraining the 
capacity for self-government of today’s democratic majority, as 
constitutional law clearly does, thus seems deeply contrary to democratic 
principles. There had better be significant benefits to outweigh these costs. 
Seidman’s critique therefore underscores the special challenges that a 
defense of constitutional authority must overcome. It is not enough to 
develop a compelling account of why law in general ought to compel 
obedience. Defenders of constitutional authority must go further; they must 
explain why democratically enacted law should be subject to the 
supposedly superior authority of an eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Constitution. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 51. Jeremy Waldron also has endorsed this premise explicitly, and indeed has defended 
it at length. See WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 49, at 21-146; Waldron, 
Against Judicial Review, supra note 49, at 1361-62. 
 52. SEIDMAN, supra note 41, at 18.  
 53. Id. at 6-7. Seidman is not quite correct about this; some free African Americans, and 
a few women, could vote at the time the Constitution was adopted. See infra note 62 and 
accompanying text. 
 54. SEIDMAN, supra note 41, at 7. 
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III. Accounts of Constitutional Authority 
Can the challenge of justifying constitutional authority be met? Drawing 
on my previous work,55 in this part I examine five competing accounts of 
constitutional authority, each of which has prominent contemporary or 
historical adherents. Four of these accounts, I argue, are implausible. The 
lone plausible account follows the lines sketched by the Court in Carolene 
Products Footnote Four and subsequently shaded in by John Hart Ely. In 
Part IV, I superimpose this account on the Second Amendment, suggesting 
that it can justify neither Heller nor most other reasonable interpretations of 
the “right . . . to keep and bear Arms.”56 
A. Authority by Consent 
A common way to justify the authority of the Constitution is to claim we 
have consented to obey it.57 These “Consensualist” accounts make intuitive 
sense: individuals sometimes consent to do something they otherwise 
would not be required to do (babysit a friend’s child, donate money to 
charity, submit renovation plans to a homeowners’ association board), and 
that consent might give them a powerful moral reason (maybe even an 
obligation) to do the thing to which they have consented. If individuals can 
create obligations through consent—including obligations to obey an 
authority (think of the homeowners’ association example)—perhaps 
societies can too. Contractarian theories of political obligation, from Locke 
to Rawls, are built on this basic premise,58 as are contemporary “popular 
sovereignty” accounts of constitutional law.59 
                                                                                                                 
 55. The previous scholarship is PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38; Peters, 
What Lies Beneath, supra note 19; and Christopher J. Peters, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and 
Constitutional Authority, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 189 
(Christopher J. Peters ed., 2014) [hereinafter Peters, Originalism]. 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 57. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 
2009) (ascribing constitutional authority to a “solemn and authoritative act” by “the people”; 
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution (Oct. 21, 1986) (speech at Tulane University), 
in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 99, 102 (Steven G. Calbresi ed., 2007) 
(describing the Constitution as “the instrument by which the consent of the governed—the 
fundamental requirement of any legitimate government—is transformed into a 
government”). 
 58. See JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 388-94 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1689); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
11-17 (1971). There are of course complexities here, many arising from the fact that Rawls’s 
theory (explicitly) and Locke’s theory (implicitly) rely, not on actual consent, but on 
hypothetical or constructive consent. It is far from clear that constructive-consent theories 
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Consent conceivably might generate the three aspects of authority 
discussed in Section II.A: normativity, content-independence, and special 
moral force or status. The fact that we have consented to do something 
might supply a reason for us to do that thing quite apart from the threat of 
punishment for not doing it. The fact of our consent also clearly is a 
content-independent reason for us to act. However distasteful we might 
now find the requirements of, say, the Second Amendment, our consent to 
obey the amendment—if in fact we have given it—provides us with a 
reason to obey its command. It seems possible, moreover, that this reason 
would have special force or status: it might rise to the level of an obligation 
or duty, not just an ordinary reason for action.  
While consent might justify the authority of some imaginable 
constitution, however, it cannot justify the authority of our Constitution. 
One cannot consent to something if one has not been given the opportunity 
to say “no,”60 and one cannot be deemed to have consented if one has been 
given the opportunity to say “no” and has in fact done so. The conjunction 
of these facts raises two insurmountable obstacles for Consensualist 
theories of American constitutional authority. 
The first obstacle is that consent to our Constitution was far from 
unanimous even at the time the relevant provisions were adopted.61 As 
Seidman points out, a great many Americans at the time of the original 
Framing—women, people of African descent, many who did not own 
property—were excluded from the process of ratifying those provisions.62 
                                                                                                                 
can find traction in the normative mechanics of actual consent. See PETERS, MATTER OF 
DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 52-57. Yet it is the intuitive and experiential force of actual 
consent that lends appeal to these constructive-consent theories. 
 59. E.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 127-52 (1999); Kurt T. Lash, 
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1444-53 
(2007). 
 60. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 16 (2004) (“Just as I can say, ‘I consent,’ there must also be a way to say, ‘I do not 
consent.’”). 
 61. See id. at 20 (“The Constitution was not approved by a unanimous vote, nor even by 
a majority of all persons living in the country at the time. . . . How can a small minority of 
inhabitants presuming to call themselves ‘We the People’ consensually bind anyone but 
themselves?”). 
 62. Women were not allowed to vote in any state at the time of the Framing, with the 
minor exception of New Jersey, which “apparently did allow a few propertied widows to 
vote.” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 19 (2005). Slaves could 
not vote in any state at that time, see id., and free blacks could not vote in Georgia, South 
Carolina, and Virginia, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED 
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These Americans were not even given the opportunity to consent (or to 
withhold consent) to the Constitution by which they subsequently were 
bound. The same is true, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, of the framing 
of the Reconstruction Amendments.63 Moreover, many of those who were 
included in these processes actually opposed ratification.64 It is difficult to 
see how these excluded or dissenting Americans somehow “consented” to 
be bound by the Constitution’s provisions. 
Even if this problem of contemporaneous nonconsent could be 
overcome, Consensualist accounts face a second fatal obstacle: the 
Americans of today are not the Americans of the Framing generations.65 No 
one alive today was alive when the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, 
or the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted, meaning that no 
American alive today actually consented to the ratification of those 
provisions. And while it is true that some Americans alive today have 
consented to obey the Constitution—naturalized citizens have done so,66 as 
have government officials67—this is a small minority of the citizenry. 
Because the American voting public is the ultimate subject of constitutional 
constraint, all of us who are members of that voting public would have to 
                                                                                                                 
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 328-29 tbl.A.1 (2000). Eleven of the 
thirteen states required ownership of property in order to vote at the time they ratified the 
Constitution. See id. Akhil Amar notes, however, that eight of these states suspended or 
liberalized their property requirements for purposes of electing delegates to their ratifying 
conventions. See AMAR, supra, at 7. 
 63. Racial restrictions on the franchise actually tightened between the Founding and the 
Civil War, such that in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, free blacks 
could vote in only eight of the thirty-three states. See KEYSSAR, supra note 62, at 53-60, 87-
89. Most property requirements had disappeared by the Civil War, see id. at 352-56 tbl.A.9 
(showing only three states with property requirements as of 1855), but women still could not 
vote in any state at that time, see id. at 172-83. 
 64. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 11, at 121-28 (describing the contentious 
process of ratifying the original Constitution); id. at 47-76 (describing ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment by provisional Reconstruction legislatures in the South); id. at 502-
04 (noting that ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was in effect coerced by requiring 
it for readmission to the Union). 
 65. See BARNETT, supra note 60, at 20 (“[A]ssuming [those who voted for the 
Constitution] could somehow bind everyone then alive, how could they bind, by their 
consent, their posterity?”). 
 66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (2012) (“A person who has applied for naturalization shall, 
in order to be . . . admitted to citizenship, take in a public ceremony before the Attorney 
General or a court with jurisdiction . . . an oath . . . to support the Constitution of the United 
States . . . .”). 
 67. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (requiring that all federal and state legislators, judges, 
and officials “be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”). 
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have given our consent to be bound in order for a Consensualist account to 
justify constitutional authority. Relatively few of us have done so. 
Consensualist accounts of constitutional authority are rhetorically 
appealing, drawing as they do on strong intuitions and a tradition of 
statesmanship that includes figures like Abraham Lincoln.68 And, if all 
Americans unanimously and freely consented to be bound by the 
Constitution tomorrow, consent might work to justify its authority over 
us—until the next generation of Americans, not having consented, assumed 
their roles as citizens. But such an act of unanimous, contemporaneous 
consent has never occurred in our country and almost certainly never will. 
It is a chimera in any large, diverse society, and without it the moral power 
of consent cannot justify constitutional authority. 
B. Authority by Substance, Part I: Moral Content 
Some theorists, most prominently Randy Barnett,69 have been convinced 
by the failure of Consensualist theories to adopt what I will call a “Moral 
Content” account of constitutional authority.70 On a Moral Content account, 
the Constitution is authoritative because its provisions are, in essence, 
substantively good ones;71 our obligation to obey the Second Amendment 
(or any other constitutional provision) stems simply from the fact that the 
provision tells us the right thing to do. On this view, morality or justice 
requires us to respect the right to keep and bear arms, and for that reason we 
should obey the amendment’s command to that effect. 
Moral Content accounts fail as accounts of constitutional authority for a 
straightforward reason: they vitiate the element of content-independence 
that is a necessary ingredient of authority. On a Moral Content account, our 
supposed reason to obey a constitutional command is that it is a 
substantively good command. But this makes our supposed obligation to 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Abraham Lincoln, The Repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the Propriety of Its 
Restoration: Speech at Peoria, Illinois, in Reply to Senator Douglas (Oct. 15, 1854), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 34, at 283, 304 (identifying 
“the sheet anchor of American republicanism” as the principle “that no man is good enough 
to govern another man, without that other’s consent”).  
 69. See BARNETT, supra note 60, at 4, 32-86 (outlining a theory of constitutional 
“legitimacy” according to which, “if a constitution contains adequate procedures to 
protect . . . natural rights, it can be legitimate even if it was not consented to by everyone”). 
For a more extensive analysis and critique of Barnett’s account of constitutional authority, 
see Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1266-73. 
 70. Elsewhere, for reasons evident from the context, I have referred to this as a “Values 
Imposition” account. See Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1272. 
 71. See BARNETT, supra note 60, at 4. 
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obey contingent entirely on the moral status of what the law requires. If 
respecting the right to keep and bear arms is the morally correct thing to do, 
then our obligation to do that thing flows entirely from the commands of 
morality and not at all from the Second Amendment; the legal command 
embodied in the amendment is superfluous. On the other hand, if respecting 
the right to keep and bear arms is not the morally correct thing to do, then 
we have no obligation to do it, despite the fact that the Second Amendment 
commands us to; the legal command embodied in the amendment is 
impotent.72 
Of course, the requirements of morality are not transparent, and so we 
can never know for certain whether, in any given circumstance, morality or 
justice requires us to respect the right to keep and bear arms. We might then 
decide to obey the Second Amendment as a way to dispel our uncertainty or 
resolve our disagreement about what to do. Note, however, that if we obey 
the Constitution as a way to resolve uncertainty or disagreement, we are not 
obeying it because its commands are good or correct; we are obeying it 
precisely because we do not know whether its commands are good or 
correct. This is an altogether different sort of reason to obey the 
Constitution—an example either of the “Moral Guidance” rationales that I 
discuss in the next section or of the procedural accounts that I examine in 
Section III.D. 
As a practical matter, the content-dependence of Moral Content accounts 
bares its teeth whenever we disagree with—or about—the substance of 
what the Constitution commands. If we believe that morality or justice 
requires us, in a given circumstance, to deny the right to keep and bear 
arms, a Moral Content account gives us no reason to obey the Second 
Amendment. On these accounts, the only reason to obey the Constitution is 
that it is correct, morally speaking, and if we deny that the Constitution is 
morally correct, we perceive no reason to obey it. Perhaps worse, if some of 
us believe the Constitution is morally correct and others deny this, then we 
will disagree, not just about morality, but about legal authority—about 
whether the law is worthy of our obedience. Law must be capable of 
quieting disagreements; it must operate, in Jeremy Waldron’s words, as “a 
decision-procedure whose operation will settle, not reignite, the 
controversies whose existence called for a decision-procedure in the first 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 383 (describing the “challenge posed” by those who 
deny the existence of legitimate authority: “when authorities are wrong, they cannot have the 
power to obligate others—when they are right, their power to obligate is meaningless. . . . 
[T]he institution of authority is either pernicious or otiose.”). 
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place.”73 Law cannot serve this function if its perceived authority extends 
only so far as the perceived moral content of its commands. 
What explains the appeal of Moral Content accounts if they are so 
saliently deficient as accounts of legal authority? I suspect that, as with 
Consensualist accounts, untested intuition is the culprit. As I discussed in 
Section II.A.3, law cannot legitimately force us to do the morally wrong 
thing; our ultimate obligation is to morality. And yet we speak and act in 
terms of an “obligation” to “obey” the law. These two senses of 
“obligation” seem to tug in opposite directions, and the easy way to 
reconcile them is to equate them, by imagining that we are obligated to 
obey the law because (and thus only to the extent that) it is consistent with 
morality. 
This intuitive equation rests on two fallacies. The first is an assumption 
that a legal obligation must be morally absolute. If the existence of a legal 
obligation implies an absolute moral duty, then law’s content cannot be 
inconsistent with morality. As I discussed in Section II.A.3, however, it is 
highly implausible that legal obligations are morally absolute. When we 
speak of a legal “obligation,” we use the language of obligation to connote 
the normativity and special moral force or status of law: our reasons to obey 
the law exist independently of the threat of force, and they are stronger than 
(or different in kind from) ordinary reasons for action. But the language of 
legal obligation leaves open the possibility that, in any given case, the 
demands of morality will outweigh those of authoritative law. Once we 
recognize this possibility, the logical necessity that law be coextensive with 
morality disappears. 
The second fallacy is the failure to distinguish between the demands of 
morality and our fallible human beliefs about those demands. Law cannot 
give us a reason to act in a way that is inconsistent with the demands of 
morality. But it can give us a reason to act in a way that we believe is 
inconsistent with the demands of morality. One way to understand accounts 
of legal authority is to see them as attempts to explain the nature of this 
reason. Moral Content accounts necessarily fail at this attempt, because 
they do not even make the attempt. They simply equate a duty of obedience 
with the demands of morality, ignoring altogether our inherent uncertainty 
about what the demands of morality really are. 
Despite their intuitive appeal, then, Moral Content accounts cannot 
justify an obligation actually to obey constitutional law (that is, 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Waldron, Against Judicial Review, supra note 51, at 1371. 
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constitutional authority). All they can do is transplant our uncertainty and 
disagreement from the realm of morality to the realm of constitutional law. 
C. Authority by Substance, Part II: Moral Guidance 
Still, the intuitive pull of authority-by-substance persists. What can 
justify legal authority, if not the idea that we will do better, morally 
speaking, to obey the law than to disobey it? This insistent notion gives rise 
to a family of more-sophisticated versions of a substantive account, which I 
have called “Moral Guidance” accounts of legal authority.74 
According to a Moral Guidance account, the authority of constitutional 
(and other types of) law rests, not directly on the content of that law as on 
Moral Content accounts, but rather on the moral judgment of the 
lawmakers. As applied to constitutional law, a Moral Guidance account 
holds that there is something special about the process of framing or 
applying a constitution, something that makes the results of that process 
more likely, on the whole, to be good or just than the results of ordinary 
democratic politics. We therefore should obey constitutional law, on this 
account, not because its provisions are sound in every instance, but rather 
because its provisions are more likely to be sound than the alternatives we 
could produce using ordinary politics. Even if we think the Second 
Amendment is pernicious, we still have a strong reason to obey it on the 
Moral Guidance account—namely that we are likely to be wrong that it is 
pernicious, while the Framers were likely to be correct that it is not. 
Note that Moral Guidance accounts seem to avoid the content-
dependence problem that dooms straight-up Moral Content accounts. Our 
reason to obey the Constitution (on these accounts) is not that the 
Constitution is substantively just. Our reason, rather, is that the Constitution 
is more likely to be substantively just than the alternatives. Moral Content 
accounts ignore the fact of our uncertainty about what morality requires, but 
Moral Guidance accounts leverage that fact. They tell us that in the face of 
our moral uncertainty, we will do better, morally speaking, to obey the 
Constitution than to follow our own fallible moral judgments. As such, they 
offer us a content-independent reason to obey the Constitution even when 
we disagree with it, which is something Moral Content accounts cannot 
offer. 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1297-1313; see also PETERS, 
MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 39-48 (describing and critiquing such an account—
using the term “Epistemic-Guidance account”—as applied to legal authority generally). 
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As general theories of legal authority, Moral Guidance accounts go back 
at least to Plato75 and find their best-developed contemporary expression in 
the work of Joseph Raz.76 In American constitutional theory, they appear in 
a variety of forms in the writings of Alexander Hamilton,77 Alexander 
Bickel,78 and Bruce Ackerman,79 among others.80 But they suffer from three 
important types of flaws—contingent, conceptual, and functional—which 
in combination doom them. 
The contingent flaw is that Moral Guidance accounts, as applied to the 
American Constitution, depend on a premise of relative moral wisdom that 
is exceedingly vulnerable, to say the least. The crux of these accounts, 
again, is that we ought to obey the Constitution even when we disagree with 
its commands, because the process of generating those commands was 
morally wiser than we are. But it is implausible that the actual Framing 
processes were morally wiser than we are to the extent required to validate 
the account. 
The Framings were arbitrarily exclusionary, as we’ve seen,81 which gives 
us double reason to question their moral wisdom. Substantively speaking, 
excluding women, people of color, and those without property from the 
ratification process was a clear moral error. Procedurally speaking, their 
exclusion compromises the deliberative and participatory qualities that 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC & THE STATESMAN 129-60 (Henry Davis trans., M. 
Walter Dunne 1901) (proposing a state ruled by wise and virtuous “guardians”). 
 76. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 21-105 (1986); see also Shapiro, 
supra note 20, at 402-08 (describing Raz’s theory of legal authority). 
 77. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 57, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(distinguishing the “solemn and authoritative act” of constitutional framing from the “ill 
humors” and “momentary inclination[s]” of ordinary politics); see also Peters, What Lies 
Beneath, supra note 19, at 1299 (interpreting Federalist No. 78 in Moral Guidance terms). 
 78. See BICKEL, supra note 14, at 23-28 (suggesting that judicial review might be 
justified because “courts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that 
legislatures and executives do not possess”); see also Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 
19, at 1302 (interpreting Bickel’s theory as a type of Moral Guidance account). 
 79. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-162 (1991); see also 
Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1299-1300 (interpreting Ackerman’s theory as a 
type of Moral Guidance account).  
 80. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good 
Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693 (2010); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A 
Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007); John O. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 
(2009); see also Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1300-01 (describing the 
McGinnis/Rappaport theory and classifying it as a type of Moral Guidance account). 
 81. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
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otherwise might justify trust in the results of the process. The fact that those 
results themselves included at least one salient and grave injustice—the 
preservation of slavery82—underscores the unlikelihood that the Framing 
(the original one at least) can live up to the demands imposed upon it by a 
Moral Guidance account. 
The Second Amendment is illustrative in this regard. Gun policy is a 
morass of competing costs, benefits, values, and interests, many of them 
dependent on empirical analysis. Why should we think a collection of 
propertied white men in 1791 were better suited to decide these issues than 
we (the majority of the American people, acting through the democratic 
process) are today? Here I want to put aside for the moment the obvious 
fact that society has changed vastly and unpredictably in the ensuing two-
and-a-quarter centuries; I will discuss that point below. Even without that 
factor, it is implausible that the eighteenth-century Framing process, with 
all its warts, was so much more morally reliable than today’s democratic 
process, with all its warts, that the latter ought to reflexively defer to the 
former’s judgments on gun policy. 
This flaw is contingent because it is not an inevitable feature of every 
constitutional system. One can imagine a constitutional process that is so 
good, an ordinary democratic process that is so bad, or a sufficient 
combination of both that it would be rational for democracy always to defer 
to the superior wisdom of constitution making. Indeed, if Americans were 
to convene a broadly inclusive, meaningfully participatory, deeply 
deliberative constitutional convention tomorrow, the result might be worthy 
of our deference on Moral Guidance grounds. But would those results 
justify obedience by Americans twenty-five, fifty, or a hundred years from 
now? I am not so sure, and the answer from a believer in moral progress 
almost certainly would be no. 
This last point hints at what I think is an even more critical flaw in Moral 
Guidance accounts—a conceptual flaw that gets worse as a constitution 
gets older. The premise of superior moral expertise is an “all else being 
equal” premise: it weakens with every obvious procedural disadvantage of 
the framing as compared to contemporary democracy. And one such 
                                                                                                                 
 82. By means of the Three-Fifths Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by id. 
amend. XIV, § 2, which counted slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of 
congressional representation and direct taxation, thus giving the slave states additional 
undeserved power in Congress; the Slave Trade Clause, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, which prohibited 
Congress from banning the importation of slaves until 1808; and the Fugitive Slave Clause, 
id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by id. amend. XIII, which required authorities in free states 
to return escaped slaves to their owners on demand. 
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procedural disadvantage, an inevitable one, is that contemporary democracy 
will have a contextual understanding of constitutional problems that the 
framers did not have.  
The Framers of the Second Amendment surely grasped (for example) the 
existence of a basic tension between the dangers to public safety posed by 
guns and the dangers prevented by them. But they could not have 
understood—could not even have imagined—the particular dynamics of 
that tension in the context of twenty-first-century America, with its 
semiautomatic weapons and high-capacity magazines, its powerful gun 
industry, its NRA, its Brady Campaign, its drug wars, its recent and 
ongoing history of mass killings, its deeply entrenched two-party system, 
and so on. Americans today have a much better contextual view of these 
contemporary dynamics than the eighteenth-century Framers could have 
had; in a very real sense, the issue of whether and how to regulate guns is a 
different issue now than it was in 1791 or in 1868. The same point could be 
made about almost any constitutional provision: the Free Speech Clause83 
in the age of the Internet, the Fourth Amendment’s84 prohibition on 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” in an era of imaging technology and 
digital-search algorithms, the Due Process Clauses85 in a world beset by 
international terrorism, and so on. 
So even if we buy the premise of the Framing generation’s superior 
moral expertise as a general matter, the Framers never brought that 
expertise to bear on many of the actual issues to which their general rules 
apply today. This was a problem familiar to Aristotle, who noted that 
all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to 
make a universal statement which shall be correct. . . . [T]he 
error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the 
thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the 
start.86 
The Framers could not have considered every possible circumstance to 
which their (very) general rules would apply in the future. Even if they had, 
they hardly could have crafted general rules (“universal statements”) 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. art. I.  
 84. Id. amend. IV. 
 85. Id. amends. IV, XIV. 
 86. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, bk. V, at 
1020 (Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., 1941). For a contemporary description of the 
problem, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 25, at 34-36. 
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capable of accounting for every such circumstance.87 A constitution pitched 
at this level of detail “would partake of the prolixity of a legal code” (to say 
the least) “and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.”88 
As our contemporary problems grow more distant from those the 
Framers could have contemplated, the force of whatever moral wisdom the 
Framers possessed gradually fades. It is one thing to trust the eighteenth-
century Framers’ judgment regarding private possession of front-loading 
muskets as a safeguard against French invasion, Indian raids, and the threat 
of federal troops also carrying front-loading muskets. It is another thing 
entirely to imagine that the Framers’ judgment extended to the private 
possession of Glocks as a safeguard against criminals carrying Uzis or 
federal troops driving tanks, flying planes, and wearing body armor. The 
Framers simply made no judgment on these modern questions. A Moral 
Guidance account therefore gives us no reason to defer to their 
(nonexistent) judgments about them. 
Note here that this conceptual flaw is not contingent on the nature of the 
framing process or even on the existence of considerable chronological 
distance from the framing, although it is aggravated by the latter. As 
Aristotle pointed out, “[T]he error is . . . in the nature of the thing”: no rule 
maker will be able to anticipate and account for every instance in which its 
rule may apply.89 A constitution framed tomorrow would confront 
unforeseen circumstances beginning the day after tomorrow. If the reason 
to obey constitutional rules is that they embody superior wisdom about the 
circumstances to which they apply, that reason begins to dissipate as soon 
as the rules are established. 
Finally, Moral Guidance accounts suffer from a functional or practical 
flaw: substantive disagreement with a constitutional provision is a reason, 
on a Moral Guidance account, to question the authority of that provision. 
Suppose a majority of Americans comes to believe the Second Amendment 
is pernicious. On a Moral Guidance account, our reason to obey the 
amendment anyway is that its Framers were more likely to be correct (about 
the utility or justice of a right to keep and bear arms) than we are. But our 
substantive disagreement with the amendment would undermine our faith in 
the superior moral judgment of the people or process that framed it. As with 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 25, at 54 (“Lacking omniscience, [the 
legislator] cannot anticipate all future problems that will meet the concrete conditions stated 
in the rule; and if he could do this, the rule would be far too complex for practical 
application.”).  
 88. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 89. ARISTOTLE, supra note 86, at 1020.  
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a Moral Content account, then (though less directly), our perceived reason 
to obey the amendment would dwindle as our disagreement with its content 
grows. As a result, the perceived content-independence of the amendment’s 
authority would be compromised: our disagreement with its content would 
weaken our belief in its authority. The amendment (or any other 
constitutional provision) would be least effective when it is needed most—
namely, when a majority of Americans disagrees with its substance. 
In combination, these three flaws spell big trouble for Moral Guidance 
accounts. In order for those accounts to work, it must be the case that (a) 
the moral judgment of the framing process was credibly superior to that of 
ordinary democracy with respect to a particular constitutional issue; (b) the 
framing process actually rendered a judgment on the particular issue in 
question—an increasing rarity given the pace of change in society, culture, 
politics, technology, and so on; and (c) those who are subject to 
constitutional law, but who disagree with the constitution on the substance 
of an issue, nonetheless continue to accept the superior moral capacity of 
the framing. The conjunction of these three conditions in the context of 
modern constitutional law is likely to be quite rare indeed. Moral Guidance 
accounts thus cannot bear the considerable weight necessary to justify 
general constitutional authority. 
D. Authority Through Procedure, Part I: Footnote Four 
A Consensualist account can justify authority in theory, but it cannot 
justify the authority of our Constitution in actual practice. A Moral Content 
account cannot justify authority even in theory, because it fails the test of 
content-independence. A Moral Guidance account suffers from both 
theoretical and practical flaws. These latter two accounts stumble in part 
because of their substantive nature: they bear the nearly impossible burden 
of convincing people who disagree with the law to obey it nonetheless, on 
the ground that the law is right and they are wrong. 
The failure of these substantive accounts hints at an alternative way to 
ground authority—not in the substance of what the law commands, but in 
the process of how the law commands it. Such a “procedural” account 
attributes authority to the Constitution, not because we have consented to it, 
and not because it is a “good” constitution or because its Framers had 
superior wisdom, but because something about the procedures of 
constitutional law makes its results acceptable even by those who disagree 
with them. Elsewhere I have referred to procedural accounts as “dispute 
resolution” accounts, because it is the prospect of resolving or avoiding 
costly disputes, according to these accounts, that might lead us to accept 
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constitutional law despite our disagreement with its content.90 On 
procedural or dispute-resolution accounts, we have an obligation to obey 
constitutional commands because, and to the extent that, doing so will 
resolve, mitigate, or avoid some costly substantive disagreement. 
(1) Ely/Footnote Four. The best-developed procedural account of 
constitutional authority is John Hart Ely’s elucidation of the famous 
“Footnote Four” in the Supreme Court’s Carolene Products decision.91 
Carolene Products deployed the now-standard “rational basis” approach to 
rubber-stamp an arguably protectionist piece of economic regulation under 
the Due Process Clause.92 In the fourth footnote of his opinion for the 
Court, however, Justice Stone suggested that more-aggressive judicial 
review might be appropriate in at least two kinds of circumstance: (1) those 
where “legislation . . . restricts those political processes which can 
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation”; and 
(2) those where government action may be motivated by “prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities . . . .”93 
Ely subsequently expanded Footnote Four into a full-blown justification 
of judicial review, which he saw as grounded in the relative political 
insularity of federal courts.94 Because they are not beholden to the political 
majority or to other branches of government, Ely argued, federal courts can 
identify and resist attempts by the majority to entrench its own power—to 
“chok[e] off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in 
and the outs will stay out”95—or to systematically disadvantage minorities 
disfavored for irrational reasons like religion or race.96 
We can understand Ely’s theory as an account of the authority of judicial 
review. Ely provides a reason to think that constitutional decisions by the 
judiciary impose a moral obligation of obedience upon us (the democratic 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 57-61; Peters, What Lies 
Beneath, supra note 19, at 1313-38; Peters, Originalism, supra note 55, at 219. 
 91. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); ELY, supra 
note 14.  
 92. See 304 U.S. at 148-54. For a description of the Filled Milk Act (the statute upheld 
in Carolene Products) as the product of special-interest rent-seeking, see Geoffrey Miller, 
The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397, 400-15.  
 93. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The Carolene Products Court added a third 
circumstance, not relevant to the analysis here: “when legislation appears on its face to be 
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments.” 
Id. 
 94. See generally ELY, supra note 14. 
 95. Id. at 103. See generally id. at 105-34. 
 96. See generally id. at 135-79. 
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majority) and our representatives in government. That reason is not that 
federal judges generally are wiser than the rest of us on the kinds of issues 
that are covered by constitutional law (a type of Moral Guidance 
rationale).97 It is, rather, that the federal judiciary can be more impartial 
with respect to these issues than the self-interested or irrationally biased 
democratic majority could be. If we accept this basic premise of 
comparative impartiality (a big “if,” to be sure), then we have reason to 
obey the judiciary’s interpretations of constitutional commands, even when 
we disagree with those interpretations. The reason is that those 
interpretations are (relatively) impartial —and thus more likely to be 
widely accepted than the (relatively) less impartial interpretations that the 
democratic process could produce. Ely thus argues, in effect, that we should 
accept judicial review because doing so brings settlement to issues that 
otherwise would be politically contested, perhaps in a very costly way. 
And in fact Ely’s Footnote Four-inspired theory forms the basis of a 
procedural account, not just of judicial authority, but of constitutional 
authority more generally. (For ease of reference, I will refer to this account 
of constitutional authority as the “Footnote Four” account.) If life-tenured 
federal judges are relatively immune to democratic pathologies, then life-
tenured federal judges interpreting rules laid down by long-ago generations 
enjoy even greater immunity to these dysfunctions. The eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Framers of the major constitutional provisions had their 
self-interests, to be sure, but their self-interests were not our self-interests; 
they had no inherent desire to entrench the power of our early-twenty-first-
century democratic majority. Nor were their irrationalities (religious, racial, 
gender-based) necessarily our irrationalities (although here the case for 
comparative impartiality is at its weakest).98 If we submit certain kinds of 
disputes to the judicially interpreted Framers—disputes involving questions 
of contemporary power entrenchment or irrational majority bias—we are 
consigning those disputes to a process that is more impartial, with respect to 
those questions, than we ourselves (the contemporary democratic majority) 
can be. The results of that process, therefore, are more likely to be widely 
accepted, even by those who disagree with them, than are the results of 
ordinary majoritarian politics. And our reason for obeying those results is 
precisely that they are likely to be widely accepted—and thus that our 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Ely rejects this rationale. Id. at 56-60. 
 98. On this point, see Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1318-20; see also 
infra note 103. 
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obedience will contribute to the settlement of social disputes that otherwise 
might be quite costly indeed. 
As a brief example, consider the paradigmatic constitutional provision on 
the Footnote Four account: the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.99 
Suppose Congress enacts a statute prohibiting corporate-funded political 
advertisements that directly refer to a candidate for federal office and run 
within sixty days of a general election.100 The harms caused by these ads 
may outweigh their contributions to political discourse, or they may not. 
But there is good reason to deny to Congress the ultimate power to decide 
this question, given all that its members have to gain or lose by the 
decision. Allowing Congress to conclusively resolve issues involving the 
extent of its own power is likely, over the long term, to yield the “long train 
of abuses” that Jefferson and Locke thought might justify revolution.101 At 
the very least it will undermine the minority’s confidence that its interests 
and viewpoints are being taken seriously, thus sowing the seeds of social 
unrest. 
This, on the Footnote Four account, is where constitutional law comes in. 
By constitutionalizing a presumptive protection for political speech, the 
First Amendment shifts final jurisdiction over these questions from the 
(blatantly self-interested) political process to the (significantly less self-
interested) constitutional process, where it will be decided by politically 
insular judges interpreting rules enacted by long-dead Framers. Our reason 
for abiding by the results of this process is not that we have consented to 
the process, or that its results are good ones, or that the process is wiser 
than we are. Our reason, rather, is that the process can be generally 
accepted as a comparatively fair one, capable of bringing relative quietude 
to disputes that otherwise might boil over into costly social strife. 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Ely discusses the Free Speech Clause at length. See ELY, supra note 14, at 105-16. 
 100. This was one effect of section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 91 (2002). The scope of section 203 was substantially 
restricted in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 463-64 (2007), and the provision 
was ultimately held invalid in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 311-12 (2010). 
 101. In his Second Treatise, Locke noted that when “a long train of Abuses, . . . all 
tending the same way”—that is, toward the benefit of those in power—becomes “visible to 
the People, . . . ’tis not to be wonder’d, that they should then rouze themselves . . . .” LOCKE, 
supra note 58, § 225, at 463. Jefferson cribbed the imagery for the Declaration of 
Independence: “[W]hen a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same 
Object[,] evinces a design to reduce [the People] under absolute Despotism, it is [the 
People’s] right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government . . . .” THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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(2) The plausibility of Footnote Four. The Footnote Four account is not a 
perfect account of constitutional authority.102 It does, however, avoid the 
fatal flaws of the substantive accounts canvassed above. 
 Unlike a Consensualist account, the Footnote Four approach does not 
depend on the fiction that modern-day Americans have consented to the 
Constitution. Our reason to obey a constitutional command with which we 
disagree is not that we supposedly have, at some earlier time, agreed to be 
bound by that command. Our reason is that the process that generated the 
command is more impartial than the alternative—ordinary politics—and 
thus accepting its results now can bring relatively stable settlement to an 
otherwise dangerously contentious issue. 
Unlike a Moral Content or Moral Guidance account, the Footnote Four 
approach is not undermined by the inevitable fact of substantive 
disagreement with the Constitution’s commands. Recall that Moral Content 
accounts make the substantive correctness of a command a necessary 
criterion of its authority, and so a person who thinks a command is incorrect 
perceives no reason to obey it. Moral Guidance accounts have the same 
problem, albeit in attenuated form: a person’s disagreement with a 
command provides a reason for her to question the basis of the command’s 
authority, namely the supposedly superior wisdom of the process that 
produced it. On the Footnote Four approach, however, disagreement (by 
itself) does not serve as a reason to question constitutional authority, 
because that authority is not contingent on the fact or likelihood that the 
Constitution is correct. Indeed, actual or potential disagreement strengthens 
the case for constitutional authority on the Footnote Four account, because 
it underscores the need for an acceptably impartial procedure to resolve that 
disagreement. 
 Finally, the Footnote Four account, unlike Moral Guidance accounts, 
does not depend on the implausible notion that the Framers were 
extraordinarily more morally capable than we are, or on the impossible 
condition that the Framers considered how the Constitution would apply to 
a host of unforeseen modern problems. For the account to work, Americans 
need only see constitutional law as a relatively impartial way to resolve 
certain issues; they need not believe that it is something close to infallible. 
And it is at least plausible that applying general rules established by past 
generations and interpreted by life-tenured judges is a less-partial way to 
                                                                                                                 
 102. For discussions of the weaknesses of the Footnote Four account, see PETERS, 
MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 69-78 (discussing a more-general version of the 
account, called there a “Dispute Resolution” account); Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 
19, at 1326-28. 
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decide issues of power entrenchment than leaving them to ordinary 
politics.103 Perfect impartiality is not necessary; the process need only be 
sufficiently more impartial than ordinary politics to justify deference to it. 
Footnote Four’s procedural account of constitutional authority, therefore, 
is more plausible than its substantive rivals. It is at least conceivable that 
the Footnote Four account can justify the authority of the Constitution. But 
Footnote Four is not the only possible type of procedural account. 
E. Authority Through Process, Part II: Bare Hobbesian Dispute Resolution 
It might be argued that we ought to obey constitutional law simply 
because doing so will foreclose otherwise costly disputes—even if there is 
no reason to think ordinary democratic procedures cannot manage those 
disputes fairly. This is a form of what I have called a “bare Hobbesian” 
account of authority. It holds that the goal of avoiding costly disputes is so 
important that we ought to obey virtually any legal command, regardless of 
the process by which that command was produced.104 
A bare Hobbesian approach is a true procedural account, because it does 
not depend on the substantive qualities of the Constitution or of the process 
that generated it. As such, it preserves the content-independence necessary 
for legal authority: one’s reason to obey the law (on this account) is 
unrelated to its content and thus undistorted by whether one agrees with that 
content. 
As the Enlightenment rejection of Hobbesian authoritarianism amply 
demonstrates,105 however, a bare Hobbesian account is saliently 
unpersuasive. The account proves both too little and too much. 
It proves too little in that it fails to justify the authority of constitutional 
law beyond the bare-bones constitutive rules necessary to get government 
institutions up and running. As H.L.A. Hart pointed out, some secondary 
rules are necessary in order for a society (and certainly for a democratic 
political community) to operate at all.106 We need to know whether primary 
legal rules are valid, who may interpret and enforce them, what to do if we 
dispute their meaning or application, and how to change them. We also 
                                                                                                                 
 103. It is less clear that deferring to the Framers’ judgments on issues involving the 
danger of irrational prejudice will generate greater impartiality. The Framing generations 
probably were at least as irrational as we are on questions of race, gender, religion, and 
ethnicity, not to mention sexual orientation. For discussion of this point, see Peters, What 
Lies Beneath, supra note 19, at 1318-20. 
 104. See id. at 1314-15; PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 57-61, 119-22. 
 105. See PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 119-22.  
 106. See HART, supra note 22, at 91-99. 
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need the secondary rules that answer these questions to be relatively stable. 
Constitutional law can perform this literally constitutive function, as indeed 
many provisions of the American Constitution do. Widespread 
disobedience to these provisions would risk chaos, and avoiding chaos—the 
Hobbesian mantra107—might itself be a good enough reason to obey 
constitutive constitutional rules. 
But avoiding chaos is not necessarily a good enough reason to obey 
constitutional rules that protect individual rights, or even structural 
constitutional rules beyond some very basic constitutive components. Once 
the bare bones of democratic government are in place, that government 
becomes fully capable of generating its own decisions on socially disputed 
questions, and those democratically generated decisions can then be obeyed 
as a means of avoiding the costs of unresolved disputes. The constitutive 
function cannot justify constitutional rules that limit the outcomes of the 
democratic process (except insofar as those outcomes undermine the basic 
constitutive rules). The most prominent rights-conferring provisions in our 
Constitution—those in the Bill of Rights and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments—go well beyond what is necessary to constitute a functioning 
democratic government.108 Americans could strike these provisions from 
the Constitution tomorrow without stepping down the slippery Hobbesian 
slope toward anarchy. A bare Hobbesian account thus might justify 
government and law at some level, but not most constitutional rights, and 
certainly not constitutional law to the extent it exists in the American 
system. In this respect the account proves too little.  
It also proves too much, in that it would justify constitutive rules of any 
content or provenance whatsoever. Hobbes himself used it, unconvincingly, 
to defend absolutist monarchy.109 If avoiding disputes takes priority over all 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 57-59 (describing Hobbes’s 
normative theory of legal authority). 
 108. The same probably can be said for the “thicker” structural provisions of the 
Constitution, such as those allocating power between the state and federal governments (e.g., 
the enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, Section 8). Once the basic mechanisms of 
the federal government are in place, that government could decide the extent of its own 
power vis-à-vis that of the states. Of course, the risk of power-entrenchment would be high, 
justifying the existence of constitutional power-allocation rules on a Footnote Four 
approach. But the bare Hobbesian account could not justify such rules, as they would not be 
strictly necessary in order for government to operate. 
 109. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 241-47 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 
1968) (1651). This defense later was eviscerated by Locke with the observation that an 
absolutist monarch’s subjects, after “a long train of abuses” by the ruler, eventually would 
rebel against the monarch’s self-serving commands, thus defeating Hobbes’s overriding goal 
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other goods, then Americans have an obligation to obey any legal command 
with respect to a controversial issue, no matter what it says and no matter 
who generated it. Americans are unlikely to accept law (constitutional or 
otherwise) on those terms, particularly since more-palatable alternatives are 
available. 
IV. The Second Amendment and Footnote Four 
I believe that the five general accounts of constitutional authority 
canvassed in Part III exhaust the field of reasonably plausible candidates. 
For a variety of reasons, four of those accounts turn out not to be plausible 
after all. A fifth, the Footnote Four version of a procedural account, seems 
plausible—more so in any event than its rivals. The question for this part, 
then, becomes: Can the Footnote Four account justify the Second 
Amendment? 
The answer, I argue here, depends on what the Second Amendment is 
understood to mean. In this part, I consider three different reasonable 
interpretations of the amendment: the “individual self-defense” reading 
endorsed by the Heller majority; an “anti-tyranny” reading (really a family 
of subtly different readings) hinted at in Heller and common in popular 
discourse; and the “structural federalism” reading offered by the dissenters 
in Heller. I contend that neither the Heller majority’s interpretation nor the 
various anti-tyranny readings of the amendment can be reconciled with the 
Footnote Four justification of constitutional authority. I suggest, however, 
that the federalism-promoting interpretation advocated by the Heller 
dissenters is at least potentially consistent with the Footnote Four account. 
A. Heller and Footnote Four 
In District of Columbia v. Heller,110 a five-justice majority of the 
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Antonin Scalia, held that the 
Second Amendment protects, against federal government interference, an 
individual right to keep and bear an operative handgun in the home for 
purposes of self-defense.111 In McDonald v. City of Chicago,112 the same 
majority, in an opinion by Samuel Alito, held that this right is 
“fundamental . . . to our system of ordered liberty” and thus is applicable 
                                                                                                                 
of conflict-avoidance. See LOCKE, supra note 58, § 13, at 316-17; id. §§ 90-94, at 369-74; id. 
§ 225, at 463; see also PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 119-22 (describing 
Locke’s critique of Hobbesian absolutism). 
 110. 554 U.S. 570, 635-36 (2008). 
 111. See id. 
 112. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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against the state governments through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.113 
Is the Heller interpretation consistent with the only plausible account of 
constitutional authority available, namely a procedural account similar to 
that of Footnote Four? To put the question another way: Does Heller’s 
Second Amendment possess valid authority on the Footnote Four 
approach? I argue here that the answer is no. 
The Footnote Four approach holds that the participants in everyday 
democracy ought to defer to constitutional commands when the 
constitutional process can be accepted as significantly more impartial than 
ordinary democratic politics. As I discussed in Section III.D, Ely and 
Footnote Four identified two basic circumstances in which this might 
plausibly be the case. 
First, constitutional law might serve an anti-entrenchment function: it 
might be comparatively impartial in determining whether measures that risk 
power entrenchment by the majority, or by government officials, are in fact 
justified. The First Amendment’s Speech, Press, Petition, and Assembly 
Clauses114 obviously serve this function, as do most of the Constitution’s 
criminal-procedure provisions115 and its various protections of the right to 
vote.116 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See id. at 767-78. Justice Clarence Thomas, the fifth vote necessary to form the 
majority in McDonald, wrote a separate opinion in which he reached the same result as 
Justice Alito but used the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
not the Due Process Clause, to do so. Id. at 805-06 (Thomas, J., concurring in the result).  
 114. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”). 
 115. See id. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting suspension of habeas corpus except “in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion,” and prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post factor laws); id. art. III, 
§ 3 (requiring two witnesses or a confession for a treason conviction and prohibiting 
“corruption of blood” as punishment for treason); id. amend. IV (prohibiting “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” and prescribing requirements for warrants); id. amend. V (requiring 
grand jury indictment for “capital[] or otherwise infamous crime[s],” prohibiting double 
jeopardy and compelled self-incrimination, and requiring due process for deprivations of 
life, liberty, or property); id. amend. VI (providing for “a speedy and public trial” by an 
impartial local jury, requiring that the accused be informed about the accusation against him, 
and providing rights to confrontation, compulsory process, and defense counsel); id. amend. 
VIII (prohibiting “excessive” bail or fines and “cruel and unusual punishments”). 
 116. See id. amend. XIV, § 2 (reducing the congressional representation of a state that 
denies the right to vote to adult male citizens); id. amend. XV (prohibiting denial or 
abridgment of the right to vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude”); id. amend. XIX (prohibiting denial or abridgment of the right to vote “on 
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Second, constitutional law might serve an anti-bias function: it might be 
relatively impartial in deciding whether laws that disadvantage “discrete 
and insular minorities”117 reflect or perpetuate irrational prejudice. The 
Religion118 and Equal Protection Clauses119 (for instance) easily can be 
understood in this light.  
To these circumstances we might add a third: constitutional law can 
serve the literally constitutive function discussed in Section III.E above, 
establishing the basic ground rules by which government can operate.120 
Ordinary democratic politics cannot decide issues (impartially or otherwise) 
if a democratic system does not yet exist. Relatively stable rules are needed 
to establish the basic governmental institutions and procedures necessary 
for a democracy to come into, and remain in, existence. Many provisions of 
Articles I through III of our Constitution qualify as constitutive rules in this 
sense.121 
As interpreted in Heller, however, the Second Amendment serves none 
of these functions. 
(1) Heller and the constitutive function. First of all, the Second 
Amendment as interpreted in Heller clearly is not the sort of foundational 
constitutive rule that is necessary for democratic government to operate. 
Americans can tell who makes, enforces, and interprets the laws that govern 
them, and how those laws are made, enforced, and interpreted, without 
having to know anything about gun possession for purposes of self-defense. 
(2) Heller and the anti-entrenchment function. Nor does the Heller 
version of the Second Amendment further an anti-entrenchment objective. 
Empowered officials or majorities have no self-interest in preventing 
citizens from defending themselves against private aggressors, and 
therefore there is no reason not to trust the democratic process to resolve 
                                                                                                                 
account of sex”); id. amend. XXIII (apportioning presidential electors to the District of 
Columbia); id. amend. XXIV (prohibiting denial of the right to vote “by reason of failure to 
pay any poll tax or other tax”); id. amend. XXVI (prohibiting denial of the right to vote to 
citizens age eighteen or older “on account of age”). 
 117. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) 
(“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities . . . .”). 
 118. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 119. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 120. See PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 243-46. 
 121. But see supra note 108. 
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disputes about the scope of a “right” or privilege of armed self-defense. As 
I explain in Section IV.B below, the “right . . . to keep and bear Arms” 
might guard against self-interested power-entrenchment if it is construed to 
protect an individual right to defend, not against private aggression, but 
rather against government tyranny. But despite a few hints in Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion,122 this is not the construction given the 
Amendment by the Heller majority. 
Let me be clear on this point: there is plenty of reason to worry that the 
ordinary political process will generate bad decisions on the question of 
whether to allow armed self-defense. I personally believe that so-called 
“stand-your-ground” laws123 are horrible public policy and that NRA and 
gun-industry financial clout is largely to blame for them.124 Pro-gun 
advocates probably have similar distaste for relatively strict registration and 
possession laws in jurisdictions that have them. But poor public policy, 
influenced by special-interest lobbying and campaign expenditures, is 
pretty much an across-the-board risk in our democracy. That risk alone 
cannot justify constitutionalizing every policy issue that is subject to it; 
otherwise there would be no space left for ordinary democracy. 
On the Footnote Four approach, constitutional law comes into play when 
there is a systemic danger, not just of bad policy or even of policy that 
serves special interests, but rather of self-interested power-entrenchment by 
the democratic majority or by officials in government.125 And there is no 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 123. Such as the laws on the books in Florida, FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2014), and 
Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2014). 
 124. See P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National-Rifle-
Association-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your 
Ground, 35 S. U. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (2007) (asserting that NRA lobbying was behind many 
such laws). The article cites material from the NRA website that unfortunately can no longer 
be found there. 
 125. I have suggested elsewhere that the basic Footnote Four approach might be 
expanded to include special-interest rent-seeking among the systemic dysfunctions in 
democracy that justify constitutional law. See PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38, at 
261-63. This might justify heightened constitutional scrutiny of legislation in circumstances 
that suggest rent-seeking, but it cannot justify the Heller reading of the Second Amendment. 
See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). For one thing, there is no 
reason to think that the subject of gun regulation is especially prone to rent-seeking, enough 
so to justify its own constitutional provision; surely the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses, properly interpreted, can police rent-seeking in that context as they do in many 
others. And even if gun regulation is a special enough hotbed of rent-seeking to warrant its 
own constitutional rule, the relevant rent-seekers are the gun industry, which benefits from 
the Second Amendment as interpreted in Heller. An anti-rent-seeking Second Amendment 
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good reason to think that the issue of whether and how to regulate armed 
self-defense against private aggression poses this sort of risk. Private 
aggression run amok, without the threat of law-abiding gun possession to 
stop it, would hardly strengthen the majority’s existing hold on power. 
(Again, I am putting aside until the next section the possibility, not formally 
endorsed by Heller, that the Second Amendment serves the “anti-tyranny” 
function of protecting against unjustified aggression by the government 
itself.) 
(3) Heller and the anti-bias function. Interestingly, the most appealing 
Footnote Four-based argument in favor of Heller’s Second Amendment is 
an anti-bias argument. Justice Alito suggested such an argument in his 
opinion for the Court in McDonald, writing in passing that “the Second 
Amendment . . . protects the rights of minorities and other residents of high-
crime areas whose needs are not being met by elected public officials.”126 
But this point, assuming it is true, proves too much. Many needs of 
“minorities and other residents of high-crime areas . . . are not being met by 
elected public officials,” 127 including the needs for education, housing, and 
health care. Does this justify constitutional rights to these goods on the 
Footnote Four approach? 
The answer is no. The anti-bias rationale does not warrant a 
constitutional remedy in every case of failed public policy, even when 
“discrete and insular minorities”128 are disproportionately victimized by 
these failures.129 The rationale applies, rather, only in cases where systemic 
                                                                                                                 
would not protect gun rights against government regulation; it would protect gun regulation 
from industry rent-seeking. 
 126. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 790 (2010). Justice Alito was 
responding to Justice Breyer’s argument in dissent that the Heller reading of the Amendment 
was not justified by Footnote Four concerns. See id. at 912, 921 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In a 
similar vein, one might cite efforts to disarm (or prevent the arming of) African-Americans 
after the Civil War as evidence that a right to bear arms is necessary to protect racial 
minorities from bias-motivated violence. Both the Heller majority and the McDonald 
plurality alluded to this history. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 609, 614-16; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 
770-78; see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805, 835-37 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment); cf. Nicholas J. Johnson, Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An 
Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1491 (2013) (contending that 
mainstream African-American support for stringent gun-control laws is inconsistent with the 
historical and continuing failure of government to protect African-Americans from private 
violence). 
 127. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 790.  
 128. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
 129. Note that one may argue against stringent gun control as a matter of policy—on the 
ground (say) that government has failed to protect against private violence—without arguing 
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majority bias against minorities prevents those minorities from participating 
fairly and fully in the democratic process. The Framers, wisely in my view, 
codified only one type of circumstance so prone to this dysfunction that it 
always triggers heightened constitutional scrutiny: legislation targeting 
religion.130 Because religion, then as now, was an obvious and recurring 
ground of majority bias, the Religion Clauses allocate to the constitutional 
process—not to ordinary politics—the ultimate authority to decide whether 
the “free exercise” of religion has been unjustifiably impaired or an 
“establishment of religion” has occurred.131 
But the primary anti-bias provision in the Constitution—the Equal 
Protection Clause132—does not itself single out any particular type or 
ground of legislation as especially prone to irrational prejudice. While that 
clause was inspired by the plight of recently freed slaves, its Framers (again 
wisely in my view) did not draft it as the “Protection of Freed Slaves 
Clause” or the “Protection Against Racial Prejudice Clause.” Instead they 
left its language open-ended, capable of being applied against whatever 
instances of democracy-crippling prejudice, on whatever basis, should 
emerge in the future. The Supreme Court, appropriately, has given structure 
                                                                                                                 
for a constitutional right against stringent gun control. Nicholas Johnson, for example, 
makes a thoughtful and provocative case that strict gun laws do not benefit many African-
American communities, which tend to suffer disproportionately from continuing “state 
failure and impotence” to police private violence. See Johnson, supra note 126, at 1496, 
1532-53. Even assuming this is a decisive argument against stringent gun-control policies, it 
does not entail that constitutional limitations on such policies are legitimate. As interpreted 
in Heller, the Second Amendment makes these policy debates largely irrelevant; there 
simply is a right to armed self-defense, whether that is good policy or not. 554 U.S. at 635-
36 (holding that the right to have a handgun in the home for self-defense cannot be 
infringed). And of course that right is not limited to citizens or communities that have 
disproportionately been victimized by government incompetence, or for that matter by 
government hostility. 
 130. E.g., Larson v. Valenta, 456 U.S. 228, 244-47 (1982) (applying Establishment 
Clause strict scrutiny to a state law that granted a preference for some religious 
denomination over others); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (requiring that a 
law be invalidated under the Establishment Clause if it lacks a secular purpose, has a 
principal effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or fosters excessive government 
entanglement with religion); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 531-32 (1993) (applying Free Exercise Clause strict scrutiny to a local ordinance that 
intentionally burdened the practices of a particular religion).  
 131. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); id. art. VI, cl. 3 (Religious Test 
Clause) (prohibiting any “religious Test . . . as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust 
under the United States”). 
 132. See id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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to the clause by applying heightened scrutiny to legislation targeted at 
characteristics that, like race, have proven particularly susceptible to 
irrational majority bias.133 
If systemic prejudice is responsible for disadvantaging racial minorities 
in “high-crime areas,” then the most obvious constitutional remedy lies 
with the Equal Protection Clause.134 It is much less obvious, to say the least, 
that an across-the-board private right to gun possession can be justified as a 
way to overcome the effects of government neglect of racial minorities. 
Gun possession is not like religion; there is no persistent historical trend of 
irrational majority bias against gun owners. Gun owners are not a “discrete 
and insular minority”135 in contemporary American society and probably 
never have been. Anti-gun legislation that is truly irrational—born of a 
“bare . . . desire to harm” gun owners as a class—would be a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause and could be invalidated on that basis.136 If the 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See generally, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (intermediate 
scrutiny of laws classifying by gender); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (strict scrutiny 
of laws classifying by race). 
 134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. It is true—and of debatable wisdom—that the Court 
has limited heightened scrutiny under the Clause to cases of “intentional” discrimination 
based on race or other suspect criteria. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-43 
(1976). It also is true that our Constitution, generally speaking, stops short of protecting 
“affirmative” rights to government benefits (like education or health care), as opposed to 
“negative” rights against impairment of certain interests or discrimination in the allocation of 
benefits. But these principles are largely the function of Supreme Court interpretations, 
rather than immutable features of the Constitution itself. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE 
IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 84-128 (2004) 
(contending that some “affirmative” rights, such as a right to a minimum level of welfare, 
are protected in principle by the Constitution but underprotected in practice thanks to 
considerations of institutional competence). The Court could redress the problem at which 
Justice Alito hints—government failure to address basic needs of minority populations—by 
(for instance) applying heightened equal-protection scrutiny to policies that create a 
disparate racial impact and are caused, not by an active intent to discriminate, but by neglect 
born of persistent racial stereotypes and power imbalances. See McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 790 (2010). This would seem a more apt response than interpreting 
the Second Amendment to protect private gun possession. 
 135. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
 136. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (employing equal 
protection and substantive due process to invalidate a federal statute that denied recognition 
of same-sex marriages, on the ground that the statute “seeks to injure” same-sex couples); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (employing equal protection to invalidate a state 
constitutional amendment denying antidiscrimination protection to homosexuals, on the 
ground that the amendment “is born of animosity toward” homosexuals); Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (employing equal protection to invalidate a ban on the 
use of food stamps by “unrelated persons” in eligible households, on the ground that the ban 
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worry is majority prejudice, Heller’s interpretation of the Second 
Amendment is overkill.137 
(4) Heller’s substantive Second Amendment. There is, then, no 
persuasive case to be made that the Footnote Four approach justifies the 
authority of the Second Amendment as interpreted by the Heller 
majority.138 On the Heller reading, the amendment commands the 
democratic majority to honor the individual right to bear arms for self-
defense.139 That command is not justified on Footnote Four’s version of a 
procedural account: it is not necessary to preserve some aspect of fair 
democratic governance. It is, rather, a substantive command—an extrinsic 
limit on what fair democratic government may do. Such a substantive 
constraint might be consistent with a Consensualist, Moral Content, or 
Moral Guidance account of constitutional authority. But those substantive 
approaches, as I’ve argued, are implausible. 
B. Footnote Four and an Anti-“Tyranny” Second Amendment 
Gun-rights advocates often speak of the right to bear arms as a hedge 
against “tyranny.”140 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller 
referenced such a view, although ultimately it was not the view embodied 
in the decision.141 Typically, however, this rhetoric does not carefully 
                                                                                                                 
derived from “a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” namely “hippies” 
living communally). 
 137. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the 
right to have a handgun in the home for self-defense cannot be infringed).  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. A quick Google search returns page after page of examples. Here are just a couple: Joe 
Otto, Second Amendment: Last Line of Defense Against Tyranny, CONSERVATIVE DAILY (Feb. 
15, 2014), http://conservative-daily.com/2014/02/15/second-amendment-last-line-of-defense-
against-tyranny/; Bob Owens, Facing Tyranny, Embracing the Second Amendment, BEARING 
ARMS (Feb. 16, 2014, 12:26 PM), http://bearingarms.com/facing-tyranny-embracing-the-
second-amendment/. But see Mark Nuckols, Why the “Citizen Militia” Theory Is the Worst 
Pro-Gun Argument Ever, ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/ 
archive/2013/01/why-the-citizen-militia-theory-is-the-worst-pro-gun-argument-ever/272734/ 
(citing January 2013 poll showing “65 percent of Americans see gun rights as a protection 
against tyranny” and quoting Senator Tom Coburn to that effect). See generally Williams, 
supra note 3 (presenting an academic version of the anti-tyranny argument). 
 141. To be precise: Justice Scalia asserted that the “ab[ility] to resist tyranny” was among 
the Framers’ reasons for codifying the “right to keep and bear Arms” in the Second 
Amendment. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 597-600 (2008) (quoted 
language at p. 598). But the right that was thus codified, according to Justice Scalia, was the 
right to keep and bear arms for purposes of self-defense. See id. at 599-600. See generally id. 
at 579-95 (explaining that the “right . . . to keep and bear Arms” was understood at the time 
476 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:433 
 
 
distinguish between two different ways in which government action might 
be “tyrannical.” 
First, a government might take actions that are valid according to the 
standards of its legal system but nonetheless unjust. American state and 
federal laws preserving and implementing slavery prior to the Civil War are 
(now) a fairly noncontroversial example.142 The problem with government 
actions like these is a moral one, not a legal one: they are unjust, but they 
are legally valid. 
Or, second, a government might take actions that are both unjust and 
invalid: actions that violate principles of political morality and are enacted 
or enforced contrary to the formal requirements of the legal system in 
question. Southern “massive resistance” to school desegregation after 
Brown v. Board of Education143 is a case in point.144 The problem with such 
government actions is twofold: they are both illegal and unjust. 
Both these types of government conduct might be encompassed within 
the general concept of “tyranny.” And the Second Amendment might be 
seen as a hedge against both of them: by protecting the right of citizens to 
arm themselves, the amendment makes it more difficult for the government 
to enforce its unjust and/or illegal policies. In assessing whether the 
amendment is authoritative, however, it matters which variety of “tyranny” 
is at issue. 
(1) A right to resist lawful but unjust government conduct. Imagine, then, 
the following interpretation of the Second Amendment: it protects a right to 
bear arms for the purpose of resisting government conduct that is lawful but 
unjust. On its surface, this interpretation appears consistent with a 
                                                                                                                 
of the Founding primarily as a right of individual self-defense). And it was this “central 
component” of the right—not the right to bear arms for other purposes, such as resisting 
tyranny or hunting—that the Court held was violated by the District of Columbia ordinances 
at issue in Heller. See id. at 599 (describing “self-defense” as “the central component of the 
right [to bear arms] itself”); see also id. at 628 (“the inherent right of self-defense has been 
central to the Second Amendment right”); id. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban 
on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition 
against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-
defense.”). 
 142. Such as the federal Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, and 1850, ch. 50, 
9 Stat. 452, which were valid as implementations of the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave 
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
 143. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 144. For an efficient overview of Southern resistance and other reactions to Brown, see 2 
MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY 862-70 (3d ed. 2011) (and 
see p. 872 for a list of sources). 
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procedural account of authority along Footnote Four lines. Surely the 
government itself—perhaps even the electoral majority supposedly 
represented by the government—cannot be trusted to fairly resolve the 
question of whether government conduct is “just.” The temptation of 
power-entrenchment would be too salient. By constitutionalizing the right 
to resist unjust government action, the Second Amendment (thus 
interpreted) removes that question from majoritarian hands and assigns it to 
politically insular constitutional processes—a classic Footnote Four 
rationale. 
There are two conceptual flaws, however, with this version of the anti-
tyranny interpretation. The first flaw is that the argument posits a (legal) 
right to resist (legal) injustice—that is, a legal right to disobey the law. 
Such a right would be logically incoherent—a contradiction in terms. If one 
has a legal right to disobey a law, then the supposed “law” being disobeyed 
is not really valid law at all. If the law to be disobeyed is valid law, then 
one cannot have a legal right to disobey it, and legal authorities would be 
legally justified in punishing disobedience. If legal authorities are legally 
justified in punishing disobedience, then disobedience cannot be a legal 
right. 
Note that to deny the coherence of a legal right to disobey (valid) law is 
not to deny the existence of a moral right to do so. As I discussed in Section 
II.A.3, above, the moral duty to obey even legitimately authoritative law 
cannot be absolute: sometimes disobedience will be the (morally) correct 
thing to do.145 The point here is simply that a right of disobedience, when 
and if it exists, cannot be a legal right. It is incoherent to assert a (valid) 
legal right to disobey a (valid) law. And so it cannot be a valid 
interpretation of the Second Amendment to read that provision as codifying 
a legal right of disobedience to valid law. 
Is this problem solved by noting that the supposed legal right to disobey 
is constitutional in stature, while presumably most or all unjust laws against 
which the right would be wielded will be subconstitutional? (There is, after 
all, nothing logically incoherent about asserting that (superior) 
constitutional law trumps (inferior) subconstitutional law.) The answer is 
no, because conflict with the Constitution renders a subconstitutional law 
invalid, not valid but subject to lawful disobedience.146 Constitutional law is 
                                                                                                                 
 145. On this point, see also ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 25, at 53-95 (discussing 
what the authors believe is an ineliminable “moral gap” between the correctness of enacting 
general laws and the (occasional) correctness of disobeying them). 
 146. See U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2. 
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power-conferring in the sense meant by H.L.A. Hart:147 consistency with 
the Constitution is a necessary condition for the validity of 
subconstitutional law. It is one thing to assert that an ordinary statute 
conflicts with some provision of the Constitution and is therefore invalid. It 
is another thing entirely to assert that an ordinary statute, while valid as 
law, nonetheless is unjust and thus subject to a constitutional right of armed 
resistance. The former proposition subjects ordinary law to a constitutional 
test of validity. The latter proposition supposes that two valid laws can be 
mutually inconsistent—a logical impossibility.148 
The second conceptual flaw with a right to resist valid but unjust laws is 
that such a right would vitiate the fundamental understanding of law that is 
reflected in a procedural account. A procedural account (such as Footnote 
Four) holds that constitutional authority is justified by the need to 
peacefully avoid, mitigate, or resolve disputes. As I have explained 
elsewhere, this approach reflects a more general account of legal authority 
by which the core function of law as a whole is peaceful dispute 
resolution.149 The basic notion—traceable at least as far back as 
Hobbes150—is that dispute resolution left in private hands inevitably invites 
violent conflict, and so the law must assert a monopoly on coercive dispute 
resolution in order to prevent private parties from “resolving” 
disagreements through violence. 
To recognize a “right” to violently resist “unjust” laws, however, is to 
transfer the power of coercive dispute resolution back into private hands. 
Surely people of good faith can disagree about whether almost any given 
law is in fact unjust. Law’s solution to this is to channel that disagreement 
through acceptable lawmaking, law-interpreting, and law-enforcing 
procedures. A right of armed resistance would, in effect, allow any citizen 
to defect from this solution if she disagrees with the results of the legal 
process. As Gregory Magarian writes, “[A]ny agitated individual or 
                                                                                                                 
 147. In rejecting an Austinian model of law as merely orders backed by threats, Hart 
pointed out that many legal rules do not fit the model: they make it possible for private 
individuals or government officials to do something (that is, they confer powers) rather than 
forbidding or requiring them to do something (that is, imposing duties). See HART, supra 
note 22, at 26-42. 
 148. Or at least a violation of a seemingly fundamental principle of valid law, namely 
that it not command the impossible. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 36-37, 38-39, 
65-79 (rev. ed. 1969) (citing, among other tenets of the “internal morality of law,” the 
principles that law not be self-contradictory and that it not demand the impossible). 
 149. See generally PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra note 38. 
 150. See generally HOBBES, supra note 109; see also PETERS, MATTER OF DISPUTE, supra 
note 38, at 57-59 (situating Hobbes’s theory within a dispute-resolution context). 
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aggrieved group may decide what types and number of arms to stockpile in 
order to deter tyranny and, ultimately, when to resort to violence.”151 And 
there is no way to limit this “right to defect” to cases of “truly” unjust laws, 
because what is “truly” unjust is precisely what people will disagree 
about.152 The result would be the dissolution of law itself: anyone who felt 
strongly enough about the “injustice” of a particular law would effectively 
be authorized to resist that law by force of arms. The endgame is a 
Hobbesian state of nature, a war of all against all—precisely the disaster 
that law, on a procedural account, exists to avoid. 
However rhetorically appealing a Second Amendment “right to resist 
unjust laws” might be, then, such a reading would be inconsistent with the 
fundamental justification of legal authority assumed by the proceduralist 
position.153 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment 
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 94 (2012); see also Carl T. Bogus, Heller and 
Insurrectionism, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 253, 257 (2008) (“The fundamental problem with 
legitimizing insurrectionism as an acceptable last resort is that there are always people who 
believe that governmental tyranny is not merely a future prospect, but a present reality.”); 
Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
291, 320 (2000) (stating that Shay’s Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion “demonstrated in 
the founding era what acts by the likes of Timothy McVeigh have demonstrated in our own 
time: that placing a right to rebel against tyranny in the hands of individuals risks violence 
by every would-be Spartacus”). 
 152. See Bogus, supra note 151, at 265.  
It does not solve the problem to say that the militia or the people may only take 
up arms against the government “if necessary” or “as a last resort.” Tyranny, 
like beauty, can be in the eye of the holder. When he leapt to the stage after 
murdering Abraham Lincoln, John Wilkes Booth shouted: “Sic semper 
tyrannis” (thus always to tyrants). 
Id. 
 153. Gregory Magarian argues convincingly that an anti-tyranny (or “insurrectionist”) 
reading of the Second Amendment is deeply at odds with the doctrine of free speech that has 
developed under the First Amendment. Magarian, supra note 151, at 92-98. The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Free Speech Clause quite robustly, to allow vigorous expressions 
of political dissent that advocate violence, even insurrection, so long as they do not incite 
imminent violence. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). As Magarian points 
out, the resulting principle is inconsistent with the notion of a right of armed resistance to 
tyranny. Magarian, supra note 151, at 92-98. Free speech doctrine embodies a commitment 
to political change through advocacy, which necessarily is a collective, indeed majoritarian 
process. Id. at 94. Advocacy “requires communication and persuasion,” and it allows “the 
government, and whatever individuals and groups . . . support the government, the same 
opportunities as would-be revolutionaries to speak and persuade, to listen and adjust.” Id. 
But a right of armed resistance is a “very different proces[s]”; it licenses any “agitated 
individual or aggrieved group” unilaterally to defect from the democratic process and 
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(2) A right to resist illegal and unjust government conduct. Suppose, 
however, that we give the Second Amendment a slightly but crucially 
different anti-tyranny reading. The amendment might be understood to 
confer a right to resist government conduct that is both unjust (morally 
speaking) and invalid (legally speaking). This reading also seems at least 
superficially consistent with the Footnote Four version of a procedural 
account. If the government or the political majority cannot be trusted to 
decide whether its actions are unjust, it certainly cannot be trusted to decide 
whether its actions are both unjust and illegal. Constitutionalizing a right to 
resist unjust and illegal actions thus removes that decision from the 
saliently self-interested political branches. 
Note that this modified anti-tyranny interpretation avoids the first 
conceptual flaw I identified in the prior version, namely logical 
incoherence.154 There is nothing incoherent about recognizing a legal right 
to resist illegal government actions—any more than it is incoherent to give 
officials a legal right to punish illegal private actions. Recognizing such a 
right does not suppose that the same conduct can be both legally authorized 
and legally forbidden. 
The second conceptual problem, however, remains in this revised version 
of the anti-tyranny interpretation. Conferring a legal right to resist unjust 
and illegal government actions would, in effect, transfer the function of 
coercive dispute resolution from public hands to private ones. People often 
will disagree about whether a given government action is unjust, illegal, or 
both. Law’s solution to this problem of disagreement is, again, to resolve it 
through agreeable processes of lawmaking, law-interpreting, and law 
enforcement. A right to resist “unjust” and “illegal” conduct is, in essence, 
a right to take the law into one’s own hands—to reject the results of these 
democratic processes in favor of individual violence. There is no principled 
way to halt the inevitable slide down the slippery slope towards Hobbesian 
chaos if such a “right” is acknowledged.155 
Again, I am not claiming that resistance (even violent resistance) to 
government tyranny is never justified, morally speaking.156 I am claiming 
                                                                                                                 
impose violence on the rest of the citizenry. Id. See generally Christopher J. Peters, 
Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2001) 
(discussing the importance of persuasion to democratic legitimacy). 
 154. See supra Section IV.B.1 (discussing the logical impossibility of a legal right to 
disobey a valid law).  
 155. See generally HOBBES, supra note 109.  
 156. See supra Section II.A.3 (discussing the defeasibility of the obligation to obey the 
law). 
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only that such resistance cannot be legally justified. No doubt 
circumstances will arise—certainly they have arisen historically—in which 
the correct thing to do, morally speaking, is to resist the law, valid or 
invalid. Members of the Civil Rights movement, for example, called 
attention to the injustice of Jim Crow laws by resisting those laws.157 By 
carefully calibrating their resistance only to particular laws they deemed 
unjust, however, and by accepting legal punishment for their actions, these 
practitioners of civil disobedience made their point while still respecting the 
general authority of the law.158 
To resist valid laws on grounds of injustice, however, while then 
resisting legal punishment for doing so is to reject the rule of law entirely. 
This kind of resistance declares that law’s dispute-resolution function no 
longer outweighs the imperative of substantive justice. It is plausible that 
the wholesale rejection of legality—as a last resort, until a reasonably just 
system can be established—is morally permissible. But the notion of a legal 
right to reject legality is nonsensical, at least if one accepts a procedural 
account of legal authority. 
So anti-“tyranny” interpretations of the Second Amendment’s “right ... to 
keep and bear Arms,” despite their popularity and their tangential 
endorsement by the majority in Heller, are not in fact consistent with a 
procedural account of constitutional authority, which I’ve argued is the only 
plausible type of account available.159 If the chief function of constitutional 
law is to avoid, mitigate, or resolve costly disputes, we should not read the 
Second Amendment to frustrate that purpose—at least not if a better 
reading is available. 
(3) Decoupling a right to keep and bear arms from a right to resist. My 
arguments in the previous two sections depend on the notion that a right to 
keep and bear arms for the purpose of preventing tyranny necessarily 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See, e.g., Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 1, 1963) 
(original manuscript), http://okra.stanford.edu/transcription/document_images/undecided/63 
0416-019.pdf.  
 158. This was Martin Luther King’s insight when he wrote the following in his Letter 
from a Birmingham Jail: 
In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law as the rabid segregationist 
would do. This would lead to anarchy. One who breaks an unjust law must do it 
openly, lovingly, . . . and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that 
an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly 
accepts the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the community 
over its injustice, is in reality expressing the very highest respect for the law. 
Id. 
 159. See supra Section II.D.  
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implies a right to use those arms to resist tyranny. On this assumption, an 
anti-tyranny reading of the Second Amendment protects a legal right to 
armed resistance against a tyrannical government. It is this concept of a 
legal “right” to armed resistance that I reject as logically incoherent, 
inconsistent with the premises of a procedural account, or both. 
It is not obvious, however, that my assumption holds. That is, it seems 
conceptually possible that the Second Amendment could protect a right to 
keep and bear arms for the purpose of preventing tyranny without also 
protecting a right to actually use those arms to resist (purportedly) 
tyrannical conduct. Perhaps protecting the right of citizens to keep and bear 
arms, even without acknowledging a right to use those arms, will deter the 
government from acting tyrannically for fear of meeting armed (albeit 
illegal) resistance. The closest analogy that comes to mind involves nuclear 
deterrence: we might say that a nation has a right to keep nuclear weapons 
as a deterrent against nuclear attacks by other nations, even if we would not 
say the nation has the right to actually use those weapons if attacked.160 
If it is possible to decouple the two supposed rights in this way, my prior 
objections seem to dissolve. The right to keep and bear arms would not 
entail a legal “right” to resist valid law, and thus it would not be logically 
incoherent. Nor would it necessarily entail a legal “right” to defect from 
lawful settlements of disputed issues by resisting laws deemed “tyrannical,” 
so it would not vitiate the very purpose of law on a procedural account. 
I am not convinced, however, that it is in fact possible to decouple the 
right to possess arms (for purposes of preventing tyranny) from the right to 
use those arms to resist conduct thought to be tyrannical. True, it is 
conceptually possible to decouple a possession right from a use right. In 
saying I have a legal right to possess item X, I have not logically committed 
myself to the further proposition that I have a legal right to use item X. For 
example, we might recognize the legal right of a pharmacist to possess a 
dangerous drug in her inventory without also recognizing her legal right 
actually to use that drug herself. 
But whether it makes sense to decouple possession rights from use rights 
depends entirely on the context. In particular, it depends on our purpose or 
rationale for recognizing the right to possession. The question to ask is not 
whether the right to keep and bear arms ever implies a right to use those 
arms. The question is whether the right to keep and bear arms for a 
                                                                                                                 
 160. I am grateful to David Jaros, Colin Starger, and Maxwell Stearns for suggesting the 
possibility of decoupling the right to bear arms from the right to armed resistance. The 
nuclear deterrence analogy did not in fact just “come to mind”; it was posed by Colin 
Starger. 
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particular purpose—the prevention of tyranny—implies a right to use those 
arms for that purpose.  
Consider again the pharmacist analogy. Our purpose for allowing the 
pharmacist to possess dangerous drugs is so she can lawfully sell them to 
others who have a prescription for them (i.e., a lawful right to use them). 
Given this purpose, it makes sense to allow the pharmacist to possess the 
drugs but not to use them herself. The purpose of allowing her to possess 
them is so she can sell them to someone else who has a right to use them. 
Under anti-tyranny rationales, however, our purpose for allowing 
citizens to possess arms is not that those citizens can then provide the arms 
to someone else who has a right to use them. Our purpose, rather, is to deter 
the government from engaging in tyranny out of fear of armed resistance. 
That purpose depends on the possibility that the government actually will 
fear armed resistance—that is, that the government will believe citizens 
might actually use the arms in their possession, despite the absence of a 
legal right to use them. The right to possess arms thus depends on the 
existence of a realistic possibility that those arms will be used illegally. 
It seems to me that to endorse a realistic threat of illegal activity is 
conceptually indistinguishable from endorsing the illegal activity itself. Or, 
if the two are conceptually distinguishable, the distinction is too thin to 
have normative significance. Free-speech law might be instructive on this 
point. In addition to punishing violent acts, government, consistently with 
the First Amendment, may punish “true threats” of violent action: 
“statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression 
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual 
or group of individuals.”161 In a strict sense, speech threatening violence is 
conceptually distinct from actual violence. But the government’s strong 
interest in preventing the latter justifies its punishment of the former; the 
threat is subsumed within the activity being threatened. In condemning the 
threat, the government is effectively condemning the activity being 
threatened. So too, the Second Amendment’s endorsement of the threat (of 
armed resistance) would effectively be an endorsement of the activity being 
threatened (armed resistance). 
If this analysis is correct, then both of the conceptual problems with anti-
tyranny rationales reemerge. The Second Amendment, while not actually 
licensing illegal activity, would endorse that activity, which seems a 
distinction without a difference. It also would endorse individual defection 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
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from the law’s settlement of social disputes, which would vitiate the 
dispute-resolution purpose of law on procedural accounts. 
I think the nuclear deterrence analogy mentioned above actually supports 
this conclusion. In fact there is no internationally recognized right to 
possess nuclear weapons—quite the contrary: the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which 190 nations are parties, actually 
prohibits the provision of nuclear weapons to nations that do not already 
have them.162 Once a nation possesses nuclear weapons, of course, it makes 
sense to deny it the right to use those weapons. But this does not mean we 
can decouple possession from use in deciding whether to allow a right to 
possession in the first place. To recognize a right to possession of weapons 
in the interest of deterring their use by others is to implicitly endorse their 
use by the possessor in appropriate circumstances. Otherwise, the intended 
deterrent effect would vanish.  
So I am skeptical that anti-tyranny rationales can be made more coherent 
or palatable by formally decoupling the right to possess arms from the right 
to use them.163 It seems to me that someone committed to an anti-tyranny 
reading of the Second Amendment necessarily is committed to at least the 
possibility of armed resistance to the government. And that possibility, 
when supposedly backed by the force of law, creates conceptual and 
normative trouble for the reasons discussed above. 
C. Footnote Four and a Structural Second Amendment 
I have argued so far that the Second Amendment lacks authority on both 
Heller’s self-defense rationale and the widely endorsed anti-tyranny 
readings of that amendment. What plausible interpretations are left? 
In his dissenting opinion in Heller, Justice John Paul Stevens agreed with 
the majority that the Second Amendment protects a right that can be 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 
483, 729 U.N.T.S 161. 
 163. There are practical and interpretive objections to this maneuver as well. Practically 
speaking, it’s far from clear that anything short of a private right to possess large numbers of 
very sophisticated and dangerous weapons would actually serve as a deterrent to government 
tyranny. (The government, after all, has an army.) As a matter of interpretation, the language 
of the Second Amendment—protecting not just a right “to keep” arms, but a right “to keep 
and bear” them—suggests that not merely possession, but some form of use (if only the 
“carrying” of arms, which is how the Heller majority interpreted “to bear,” 554 U.S. 570, 
584-91 (2008)), is allowed. This seems to further blur the possession/resistance line that 
must be drawn to sustain the decoupling maneuver. 
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enforced by individuals.164 But he denied that the right in question is a right 
to keep and bear arms for self-defense.165 He concluded, rather, that the 
Amendment protects “a right to use and possess arms in conjunction with 
service in a well-regulated militia.”166 His interpretation rested primarily on 
the presence and language of what the majority called the Amendment’s 
“prefatory clause”167—“[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State”168—and on the drafting and enactment history of 
the amendment.169 Justice Stevens determined that the Framers intended 
(and the contemporaneous public understood) the amendment to prevent the 
new federal government from disarming the citizens’ militias within the 
states (which were important safeguards against insurrection and invasion 
in the late eighteenth century), thereby preserving the fragile federal-state 
balance of power in the newly formed nation.170 
Justice Stevens thus interpreted the Second Amendment in essentially 
structural terms—as “a federalism provision,” as he later described it in his 
McDonald dissent,171 one similar in function to the Tenth Amendment172 or 
to judicially defined limits on Congress’ Commerce power.173 The point of 
the amendment was not to protect individuals against private aggression, 
but rather to preserve a sphere of inviolable state power against federal 
encroachment.174 Thus the scope of the amendment extended only to the 
                                                                                                                 
 164. 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Surely [the Second Amendment] protects 
a right that can be enforced by individuals.”). 
 165. See id. at 637 (“[T]there is no indication that the Framers of the [Second] 
Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the 
Constitution.”). 
 166. Id. at 651. 
 167. Id. at 577, 595-600 (majority opinion). 
 168. See id. at 640-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 169. See id. at 652-62. 
 170. See id. at 661-62.  
 171. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 897 (2010) (quoting Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)). 
 172. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584-93 (2012) 
(limiting the Commerce power to the regulation of economic “activity” rather than 
inactivity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-67 (1995) (holding that the Commerce 
power does not allow regulation of “noneconomic” activities that are not interstate or foreign 
commerce); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 174. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 643, 661-62 (2008).  
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possession and use of arms in the context of service in an organized state 
militia (which today probably would mean service in a state National 
Guard). 
(1) Structure and Footnote Four. Justice Stevens’s structural reading of 
the Second Amendment easily can be understood in Footnote Four terms. 
Constitutionalizing protection for state militias against federal 
encroachment most likely goes beyond the bare-bones level of constitutive 
ground rules necessary for government to function, although one might 
reasonably argue otherwise. But it certainly accords with the Footnote Four 
worry about self-interested majorities and power entrenchment. Surely the 
federal government itself cannot be trusted to uphold state autonomy or 
police the boundaries of its own powers vis-à-vis those of the states. By 
(partially) insulating from political control what was, in the late-eighteenth 
century, a prominent source of sovereign power—armed citizens’ 
militias—the Second Amendment thus solved a potential power-
entrenchment problem. Our reason to obey the Amendment today, so 
understood, is to preserve this relatively fair and impartial resolution of one 
aspect of the federal-state power struggle. 
(2) Anti-tyranny redux? But does this structural-federalism interpretation 
fall victim to the critique of the anti-tyranny reading I advanced in Section 
IV.B, above?175 I suggested there that there is no meaningful distinction 
between a legal right to possess arms for the purpose of deterring tyranny 
and a legal right to use those arms to resist tyranny. And a legal right to 
armed resistance of supposedly tyrannical government, I argued, is 
incoherent, inconsistent with the dispute-resolution premises of the 
Footnote Four account, or both. 
The Heller dissenters read the Second Amendment to protect the states’ 
right to maintain armed, organized militias as a hedge against federal 
overreaching.176 Is this simply an anti-tyranny argument in federalism’s 
clothing? What would be the purpose of preserving state-controlled militias 
if not to allow the states to engage in armed resistance against federal 
tyranny? If that is the amendment’s purpose, then it is, as I’ve argued, 
incoherent: there cannot be a legal right to violate the law. Such a purpose 
also would be at odds with the notion of lawful dispute resolution that 
underlies the Footnote Four approach. 
However, while in some sense the structural-federalism reading is an 
“anti-tyranny” reading, it differs from the interpretations discussed in 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Thanks to Colin Starger for noting this potential objection. 
 176. 554 U.S. at 661-62.  
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Section IV.B because it does not depend on the threat of illegal armed 
resistance to lawful authority. Ensuring the states’ access to armed militias 
can be understood as simply a way of reducing the states’ reliance on the 
federal government. According to this reading, armed state militias can 
keep the peace, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, all without 
having to call immediately on Washington (and its standing army) for 
assistance. These functions preserve state autonomy without licensing 
actual state resistance against the federal government. In doing so, the 
Second Amendment guards against tyranny in the same indirect way that 
the structural Constitution in general does: by preventing the concentration 
of power in a single unit of government. 
On this relatively modest structural-federalism reading, the Second 
Amendment serves roughly the same function as the constitutional 
reservation to the states of the general police power. A general police 
power, like the power to control an armed citizens’ militia, risks misuse by 
the state governments. But the risk of misuse is not the reason for reserving 
the power. The reason for reserving to the states the power embodied in 
armed citizens’ militias is (on this view) the preservation of some degree of 
state autonomy, even when the use of armed force is required. That the 
states need not call Washington every time armed troops would be helpful 
does not mean that the states are licensed to deploy those troops against the 
federal government. 
(3) An authoritative Second Amendment? Justice Stevens’s structural 
federalism reading therefore can be understood as consistent with Footnote 
Four’s procedural account of constitutional authority. I acknowledge that by 
distinguishing Justice Stevens’s reading from problematic anti-tyranny 
interpretations, I am giving that reading the benefit of the doubt. And of 
course it is reasonably possible to disagree with Justice Stevens’s reading, 
either at the level of interpretive methodology or at the level of application 
of methodology. It is possible, in other words, that the structural federalism 
reading is an incorrect interpretation of the Second Amendment. 
But we do not know the “correct” meaning of the Second Amendment or 
the proper methodology for identifying that meaning. On these questions, 
we humans are unavoidably fallible, and thus uncertain, and thus prone to 
inevitable disagreement. The best we can do is ask whether Justice 
Stevens’s interpretation is reasonable when measured against the only thing 
that can matter given our fallibility: the conventions of constitutional 
interpretation within the American tradition. And while the fact that four 
justices endorsed Justice Stevens’s reading may not be conclusive evidence 
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of its reasonableness, it should at least shift the burden of proof to anyone 
seeking to argue otherwise.177 
In any event, I will assume for present purposes that both Justice Scalia’s 
interpretation for the majority and Justice Stevens’s for the dissent are 
reasonable ones. Putting aside variations in minor details, I believe those 
two readings of the Second Amendment, plus the anti-tyranny readings 
canvassed above, are the only reasonable interpretations of the amendment 
that can be advanced. Of these, only Justice Stevens’s structural-federalism 
reading is potentially consistent with a plausible account of constitutional 
authority.  
V. Conclusion: The Second Amendment and the Function 
of Constitutional Rights 
I have argued here that the authority of constitutional law must be 
justified, if it can be justified, on procedural grounds—on the basis of how 
the Constitution commands us rather than what the Constitution commands. 
As the case of the Second Amendment suggests, this conclusion has 
particular significance for constitutional rights. 
It is easy to understand many or most of our Constitution’s structural 
provisions in procedural terms. Separation of powers, bicameralism, 
federalism, and other structural components arising from the Constitution 
typically can be seen as necessary constitutive elements of our democratic 
government, or as ways to distribute and divide sovereign power so as to 
solve power-entrenchment problems. But the procedural case for 
constitutional rights is not so straightforward. Constitutional rights are 
content-limiting, not merely constitutive: they determine which results a 
fully constituted and functioning democratic government is permitted to 
reach. It is tempting, then, to imagine that many or most constitutional 
rights can be justified only on substantive terms—as means of protecting 
certain sacrosanct moral values from democratic encroachment. 
This temptation often is indulged by the commonplace observation that 
the Framers, products of their time, shared a general belief in prepolitical 
“natural rights.”178 From a proceduralist point of view, however, it is 
interesting to note that the Framers included very few rights-conferring 
provisions in the original Constitution, believing that its structural 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. Justice Stevens was joined in dissent by Justice Souter, 
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. 
 178. E.g., BARNETT, supra note 60, at 53-86; CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, RIGHTS OF OUR 
FATHERS 172-92 (1968). 
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safeguards alone would provide ample “security . . . to the rights of the 
people.”179 The effect of this forbearance, whether intended or not, was to 
leave most disputes about rights—about their content, their application, 
even their existence—to be worked out in the everyday democratic process, 
and to constitutionalize only a set of structural ground rules for deciding 
these issues fairly. The Framers may have believed in natural rights, but 
their first instinct was to subject issues of rights to resolution by democratic 
government, not to impose their own views about those issues on future 
generations of Americans. In this sense, the 1787 Constitution was a 
strikingly proceduralist document. 
Of course, the Framers soon added the Bill of Rights to that document, in 
part thanks to antifederalist worries that natural rights otherwise would not 
be sufficiently protected.180 As Ely has shown, however, most provisions of 
the Bill of Rights serve anti-entrenchment or anti-bias functions.181 The 
same can be said for the rights-conferring provisions of the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.182 The Fifteenth Amendment183 and the 
                                                                                                                 
 179. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 57, at 265 (James Madison); see THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 57, at 433, 435 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 [A] minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a 
Constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate 
the general political interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the 
regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. . . . 
 I go further, and affirm that bills of rights . . . are not only unnecessary in 
the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain 
various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would 
afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the 
Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose,A BILL 
OF RIGHTS. 
Id. 
 180. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 11, at 135-41 (describing the debates 
leading to ratification of the Bill of Rights). 
 181. See ELY, supra note 14, at 93-98. 
 182. See id. at 98. Ely does concede that the Thirteenth Amendment “surely . . . 
embodies a substantive judgment” against slavery, id., but of course any anti-bias provision 
must embody a “substantive judgment” in this sense—that is, as a means of distinguishing 
between biases that are irrational or otherwise unjustifiable and those that are not. 
 183. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude . . . .”). 
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subsequent voting-rights amendments184 serve all three purposes identified 
by the Footnote Four account: anti-entrenchment, anti-bias, and 
constitutive.185 
The Second Amendment, however, is not so easily squared with 
Footnote Four. On most plausible interpretations, the amendment does 
nothing more than impose a controversial substantive value—the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms—on the American public, depriving us of 
our capacity to resolve that controversy through democratic means. Only 
Justice Stevens’s structural-federalism reading of the amendment— 
understood charitably, perhaps—can claim any grounding in the Footnote 
Four account. And the Footnote Four account is the only justification of 
constitutional authority that can assert any claim to plausibility. 
In other words, on most readings, the Second Amendment lacks 
authority. Does this fact license disobedience to the amendment—or at least 
to Heller’s interpretation of the Amendment—by (say) states or localities 
seeking to implement strict gun-control measures? Not necessarily; the idea 
of piecemeal disobedience of the Constitution poses its own serious 
difficulties on a procedural approach. But that is a topic for another day. 
Here I want to conclude by suggesting two implications we might draw 
about constitutional rights, and about constitutional law more generally, 
from the case of the Second Amendment. 
A. Footnote Four as Jurisdictional Principle 
First, the fate of Heller’s Second Amendment on a Footnote Four 
account suggests a principle of constitutional jurisdiction—a meaningful 
boundary line between those subjects that legitimately can be 
constitutionalized and those that cannot. Some issues (involving the basic 
structure of government, the political rights of democratic minorities, the 
fair treatment of historically victimized groups) cannot be resolved by 
everyday democracy without raising serious constitutive, entrenchment, or 
bias problems. These issues are properly resolved, at least at last resort, 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See id. amend. XXVI (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen 
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of age.”); id. amend. XXIV (“The right of citizens of the United States to 
vote in any [federal election] shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any 
State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); id. amend. XIX (“The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or 
by any State on account of sex.”). 
 185. Ely discusses these franchise-enlarging amendments at ELY, supra note 14, at 98-
99. 
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through extra-democratic constitutional processes. That is, they are 
appropriate subjects of constitutional law. 
But most politically contested issues do not fit this description. The issue 
of whether and how to allow individual gun possession for self-defense, for 
example, is perfectly susceptible of fair resolution through the majoritarian 
democratic process. Of course, many Americans will not like the outcome 
of that resolution, but this is an inevitable feature of any dispute-resolution 
process. The same holds for other purely substantive topics of dispute, such 
as (for example) whether it is bad or wrong or harmful to consume 
alcoholic beverages. Footnote Four thus explains the now-commonplace 
notion that the Eighteenth Amendment186 was not just a bad idea but 
affirmatively unsuitable for inclusion in the Constitution—that is, outside 
the Constitution’s proper jurisdiction.187 
This jurisdictional principle also might be used to critique other 
provisions of our Constitution or particular interpretations of those 
provisions. Consider the right to choose an abortion first declared in Roe v. 
Wade188 and upheld in truncated form in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.189 
As the Roe Court understood the right, it embodied a pregnant woman’s 
strong personal interests in liberty and autonomy,190 interests that were 
powerful enough to outweigh the uncertain, inchoate interest of the state in 
preserving the life of the fetus before viability. Roe thus exemplifies the 
doctrine of “substantive” due process, which limits the authority of the 
government to infringe certain “fundamental” personal liberty interests. 
So understood, the abortion right, and other manifestations of substantive 
due process, do not fit Footnote Four.191 As with Heller’s substantive right 
of armed self-defense,192 the right to abortion clearly is not a constitutive 
rule of the type necessary to create basic institutions and procedures of 
democratic government. Nor is it an anti-entrenchment rule: unlike 
restrictions on voting or political expression, restrictions on abortion do not 
                                                                                                                 
 186. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933) (prohibiting “the manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation 
thereof from the United States”). 
 187. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 14, at 99 (describing the Eighteenth Amendment as an 
“attempt[] to freeze substantive values” that “do[es] not belong in a constitution”).  
 188. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). 
 189. 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992). 
 190. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“The detriment that the State would impose upon the 
pregnant woman by denying this choice [to terminate a pregnancy] altogether is apparent.”). 
 191. Ely himself thought Roe was wrongly decided. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of 
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
 192. See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
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make it more difficult to unseat government officials or the current political 
majority. 
There is, I think, a nearly irrefutable argument that abortion restrictions 
unfairly limit the ability of women to participate fully in social, economic, 
and political life, and a plausible argument that such restrictions often are 
motivated by gender or religious bias. An abortion right thus might be 
understood to fulfill the anti-bias function of constitutional law on the 
Footnote Four approach: abortion restrictions tend to handicap women’s 
participation in the democratic process, and the political majority cannot be 
trusted to determine whether and when this is so because of persistent 
gender and religious prejudice. 
The trouble is that Roe was not written as an anti-bias decision, and 
substantive due process doctrine more generally is not animated by anti-
bias concerns. Roe grounds the right it upholds, not in the danger of 
systemic bias against the regulated class—essentially an equal-protection 
concern—but rather in the notion that the interests of persons in that class 
are too important to be regulated by the majority. This is the essence of 
substantive due process: the premise that there are certain substantive 
outcomes the democratic process is not entitled to reach. Heller shares that 
premise. The premise might make sense if we have consented to place those 
outcomes off-limits, or if the Constitution or its Framers could identify off-
limits outcomes better than we can. But none of these contentions are 
plausible, as I’ve argued. 
So the critique of Heller also applies to the doctrine of substantive due 
process. That said, I suspect many manifestations of substantive due 
process, including the abortion right, can be justified on alternative 
Footnote Four grounds,193 just as the Second Amendment might be. The 
                                                                                                                 
 193. Several prominent scholars have suggested that a better grounding for the Roe result 
would have been equal protection—specifically the need to protect women from the 
political, social, and economic disabilities imposed by unwanted pregnancies. See, e.g., Jack 
M. Balkin, Jack M. Balkin (judgment of the Court), in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE 
SAID 31, 42-45 (Jack M. Balkin, ed., 2005); Reva B. Siegel, Reva B. Siegel (concurring), in 
WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra, at 63, 63-82. The plurality in Casey hinted at 
such a grounding for the abortion right. See 505 U.S. at 835 (“The ability of women to 
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their 
ability to control their reproductive lives.”). Similarly, substantive due process decisions 
protecting homosexual conduct, such as Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), might be 
understood in Footnote Four terms, as safeguards against irrational majority bias directed at 
homosexuals. (Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence, which relied on equal 
protection rather than substantive due process, would have taken essentially this approach. 
See 539 U.S. at 579.) 
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most important lesson of Heller therefore might be one of flexibility in 
constitutional interpretation. I have more to say on that point below. 
Footnote Four’s implicit jurisdictional principle also can be deployed to 
evaluate the suitability of proposed constitutional amendments. Consider 
recent proposals to amend the Constitution to prohibit desecration of the 
national flag194 or to ban recognition of same-sex marriage.195 I happen to 
think both of these measures would be very bad policy, but the Footnote 
Four critique of Heller suggests a more categorical reason to oppose them: 
neither could be justified on procedural grounds. No conceivable 
constitutive, anti-entrenchment, or anti-bias purpose would be served by 
banning flag desecration (as opposed to protecting it, as the Free Speech 
Clause now does),196 or by prohibiting same-sex marriage (as opposed to 
allowing it, as the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses now do).197 To 
adopt these amendments would simply be an attempt to bind future 
democratic majorities to the current majority’s preferred substantive values.  
It is worth noting that substantive accounts of authority cannot yield a 
jurisdictional principle of this sort. Consensualist and Moral Guidance 
accounts offer no basis for identifying appropriate subjects of constitutional 
amendment; so long as an amendment achieves sufficient consent or is 
adopted by a comparatively wise framing process, anything goes. 
(Ironically, these substantive accounts provide no substantive criteria for 
deciding what should go into a constitution.) Moral Content accounts, in 
contrast, turn entirely on substance (if it is morally good or just, it gets in) 
and thus reduce the question of constitutional jurisdiction to the inherently 
contentious question of substantive merit. 
B. Authoritativeness as Interpretive Principle 
An authority-based analysis of the Second Amendment implies an 
interpretive principle as well as a jurisdictional one. Heller’s Second 
Amendment lacks authority, but the Heller dissenters’ Second Amendment 
arguably possesses it. We have no duty to obey a constitutional command 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See, e.g., Flag-burning Amendment Fails by One Vote, CNN (June 28, 2006), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/06/27/flag.burning/index.html. 
 195. See, e.g., Laurie Kellman, Gay Marriage Ban Falls Short of Majority, WASH. POST 
(June 7, 2006, 2:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/ 
06/07/AR2006060700929_pf.html. 
 196. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 197. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (invalidating state laws restricting 
marriage to different-sex couples on substantive due process and equal protection grounds); 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating federal statute prohibiting 
recognition of same-sex marriages on substantive due process and equal protection grounds). 
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that lacks authority, as I explained in Part II. All else being equal, the Court 
should interpret constitutional provisions in the way that best justifies our 
duty to obey them. And so (all else being equal) we ought to prefer the 
Heller dissenters’ reading of the Second Amendment to the majority’s, 
because the dissenters’ reading better justifies the amendment’s authority. 
This conclusion might be generalized roughly as follows: as between two 
or more reasonable interpretations of a constitutional provision, all else 
being equal, a court should choose the one that better accords with a 
plausible account of constitutional authority. This principle, of course, 
would require that courts and other interpreters consciously take the 
question of constitutional authority into account in deciding what the 
Constitution means. 
Elsewhere, I have argued for this proposition at the level of general 
theories or methodologies of constitutional interpretation.198 The question 
of interpretive methodology is in essence a question about the appropriate 
source of constitutional norms—about where those norms may be found. 
May an interpreter derive constitutional norms from somewhere other than 
the text (given endemic textual underdeterminacy, the answer has to be 
yes), and if so, from where? Must the norms be derived from some fact 
about the world as it existed when the text was created or ratified (the 
authors’ intentions, the public’s understanding of the text’s meaning)—an 
originalist premise? Or may the norms come from somewhere else: 
evolving traditions, perhaps, or even the dictates of justice or good policy as 
argued by the litigants or determined by the court? May nontextually 
derived constitutional norms ever override the norms clearly communicated 
by the text? When we debate interpretive methodology, these are the kinds 
of questions we are asking. 
I have argued in prior work that these questions about the source of 
constitutional norms should be answered in the way that best makes sense 
of constitutional authority.199 The sources to which we look to identify 
norms ought to reflect the reasons why we think those norms are 
authoritative. Because the best account of constitutional authority is a 
procedural account along Footnote Four lines, I have contended that 
interpreters should look for sources of constitutional norms that can fulfill 
the constitutive, anti-entrenchment, or anti-bias functions of constitutional 
law on such an account. The text is one such source, since the text by itself 
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 199. See generally Peters, What Lies Beneath, supra note 19. 
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is capable of communicating constitutive rules and (as an inanimate object) 
feels no irrational bias or temptation to entrench its own power. Original 
intent or meaning can be another such source; long-dead Framers have no 
interest in entrenching the power of current majorities or government 
officials. The considered moral and political judgments of life-tenured 
judges, narrowed and informed by the adversarial adjudicative process, can 
be yet another source of relative impartiality on issues involving the 
potential for entrenchment or irrational bias. 
I thus have suggested that the Footnote Four account leads to a relatively 
flexible, capacious approach to constitutional interpretation. Of course, 
such an approach often will leave open the possibility of multiple 
alternative interpretations of any given constitutional provision in any given 
case. In fact, even methodologies that are more dogmatic frequently will 
underdetermine the meaning and application of a particular constitutional 
provision. “New Originalist” theorists like Randy Barnett and Larry Solum, 
for example, acknowledge that their “original meaning” approach often 
leaves considerable room for judicial “construction” of constitutional 
meaning when the original meaning of a constitutional provision runs 
out.200 
A commitment to a methodology of interpretation, then, frequently will 
not determine the result of a particular constitutional case. Zones of 
indeterminate meaning will appear with regularity under most or all 
plausible interpretive approaches. And the analysis in this Article implies 
that within these zones of indeterminacy, the interpreter’s decision about 
what a particular constitutional provision means should be influenced, 
perhaps even driven, by considerations of authority. If the provision would 
possess authority on one possible meaning and would lack it on another, 
then the interpreter—barring some extrinsic reason to the contrary—ought 
to choose the meaning that confers authority. Just as no provision of the 
Constitution should be presumed to be without effect,201 so no provision 
should be presumed to lack authority. 
The underlying difficulty, of course, may well be that judges (and other 
Americans) fundamentally disagree about why the Constitution has 
authority over us. But we shouldn’t accept this disagreement as a given. 
                                                                                                                 
 200. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 60, at 118-30; Lawrence B. Solum, The 
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Unlike interpretive methodology or the meaning of particular provisions, 
the problem of constitutional authority is woefully underexplored in our 
jurisprudence, so much so that it is rarely clear whether or on what basis 
people disagree about it. How we interpret and apply the Constitution ought 
to depend on why we are doing so—on why we think the Constitution binds 
us in the first place. Heller’s troubling Second Amendment should prompt 
us to take that fundamental question seriously. 
 
